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ABSTRACT 
On April 15, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral 
arguments in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc. on the question, “Are human genes patentable?” 
This article argues that human genes are not patentable and that 
isolating a gene from its surroundings in a human body—or 
creating synthetically what exists in nature as DNA—does not 
cause the DNA to become patentable subject matter. The isolated 
DNA segments of claim 1 have the identical nucleotide sequence 
and the same function as native DNA, and the isolated DNA of 
claim 1 do not reflect the marked changes required under 
Chakrabarty, or the inventive step required under Prometheus, to 
change an unpatentable product of nature into patentable subject 
matter. Claim 2 describes those nucleotides in the DNA sequence 
that code for the polypeptide identified in the Myriad Genetics 
patent specification and simply reflects the genetic code, an 
unpatentable law of nature. Since no inventive step has been added 
to the law of nature, claim 2 constitutes unpatentable subject 
matter under Prometheus. The Federal Circuit’s contrary decision 
in Myriad Genetics disregards 150 years of Supreme Court cases 
that physical phenomena found in nature and laws of nature are 
not patentable subject matter and threatens to enclose building 
blocks of nature under federal patent law. The Supreme Court 
should reverse the Federal Circuit’s decision in Myriad Genetics 
on claims 1 and 2.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“The grant of an exclusive right to an invention was the creation of society-
at odds with the inherent free nature of disclosed ideas-and was not to be 
freely given.”  
– Justice Clark for a unanimous Supreme Court1 
“Most industries could get along fine without patent protection.” 
– Judge Richard A. Posner2 
“Life’s instructions ought not be controlled by legal monopolies at the 
whim of Congress or the courts.”  
–  James D. Watson3 
  
 “Diagnostic genetic testing for the existence of BRCA mutations is 
. . . an important consideration in the provision of clinical care for breast or 
ovarian cancer.”4 Myriad Genetics uses its patents in cancer-screening 
genetic tests and has sued companies using competing genetic tests for 
patent infringement.5 Meanwhile, patients claim that they have been unable 
to obtain needed genetic testing as the result of Myriad Genetics’ patent 
enforcement.6 The Association for Molecular Pathology filed suit and 
obtained a U.S. District Court declaration that Myriad Genetics’ patents on 
isolated DNA segment were invalid. When the Federal Circuit reversed the 
District Court decision, the Association petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court 
to hear the case.7 
 On November 30, 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. on the 
                                                      
1 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.1, 9 (1966). 
2 Richard A. Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in America, THE ATLANTIC, 
July 12, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-there-are-
too-many-patents-in-america/259725. 
3 Brief of James D. Watson, Ph.D. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 
1, Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., No. 12-398 (U.S. Jan. 
31, 2013), 2013 WL 432951, at *1. James Watson is, of course, the co-discoverer 
of the double helix structure of deoxyribonucleic acid (and winner of the Nobel 
Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 1962). 
4 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 689 F.3d 1303, 1314 
(Fed. Cir. 2012). 
5 Id. at 1314–16. 
6 Id. at 1315.  
7 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., No. 12-398 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2012), 2012 WL 4502947. 
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question, “Are human genes patentable?”8   The composition claims of the 
patents at issue “cover two ‘isolated’ human genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2 
. . . and certain alterations, or mutations, in these genes associated with a 
predisposition to breast and ovarian cancers.”9  In spite of an earlier remand 
from the Supreme Court for the Federal Circuit to reconsider its 2011 
decision in Myriad Genetics in light of the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision 
in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,10 the 
Federal Circuit held—in a conflicted opinion with two separate 
concurrences—that the BRCA gene claims constituted patentable subject 
matter.11 
 Each of the Federal Circuit’s Myriad Genetics opinions either 
disregarded or misapplied the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in 
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. that certain 
medical diagnostic claims constituted unpatentable laws of nature.12 The 
Prometheus Court declared that over 150 years of Supreme Court 
                                                      
8 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 694 (Nov. 30, 2012), 2012 WL 4508118. The 
Federal Circuit decided the case for the second time on August 16, 2012, with three 
separate opinions, including one in dissent, reported as Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d 
1303. The US Patent and Trademark Office was dismissed from the suit earlier, and 
that dismissal was not appealed. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Myriad 
Genetics, No. 12-398, 2012 WL 4502947, at *ii. 
9 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1304. 
10 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2011). 
11 689 F.3d at 1333. The District Court's decision finding the product claims to 
constitute unpatentable subject matter is Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office, 702 F.Supp.2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The Federal 
Circuit’s initial decision reversing the District Court’s decision is reported at 653 
F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). There were both process and product claims at issue, 
and for a detailed discussion of the 2011 Federal Circuit decision in Myriad 
Genetics on claim 1 of the product patents, see Douglas L. Rogers, Coding For 
Life—Should Any Entity Have The Exclusive Right To Use And Sell Isolated DNA?, 
12 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1 (Fall 2011). At 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded the 2011 decision in Myriad 
Genetics for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in 
Prometheus. 
12 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. In Prometheus, the District Court for the 
Southern District of California had granted summary judgment invalidating the 
patents. 2008 WL 878910, *14 (S.D. Cal. 2008). The Federal Circuit reversed. 581 
F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
vacated—at 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010)—the Federal Circuit’s decision for 
reconsideration in light of its earlier decision in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 
(2010). On reconsideration the Federal Circuit again reversed the decision of the 
District Court. 628 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Then the Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit on the merits. 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 
(2012). 
437 AFTER PROMETHEUS [Vol. 11 
 
precedents “insist that a process that focuses upon the use of a natural law 
also contain other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes 
referred to as an ‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that the patent in 
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law 
itself.”13 The Supreme Court further cautioned that patents tying up uses of 
the laws of nature could inhibit future innovation.14  
 This article argues that the Supreme Court should reverse the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in Myriad Genetics and continue to protect what 
has existed as part of the public domain throughout our history—physical 
phenomena and laws of nature. Under Prometheus and other Supreme Court 
precedents, patent claims that focus on a natural law must contain an 
inventive concept and must not merely apply known practices or 
limitations. Myriad Genetics’ Claim 1 simply describes a physical 
phenomenon and a law of nature—specified sequences of DNA that result 
in the creation of specific amino acids—without any inventive concept. 
Myriad Genetics’ Claim 2 is a subset of Claim 1 and simply describes the 
DNA nucleotides that create the amino acids pursuant to a law of nature—
again without any inventive concept. 
 Part I of this article analyzes the Supreme Court precedents that 
limit exclusive patent rights preventing other market participants from 
freely using laws of nature and physical phenomena to compete. 
Specifically, part I argues that Prometheus clarifies the boundaries for 
patent eligible subject matter in the genetic age so building blocks of nature 
remain free for all to use.15  
                                                      
13 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (emphasis added). 
14 Id. at 1301 (citing Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman, & R. Wolk 
Wagner, Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L.REV. 1315 (2011); CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY 
AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 112 (Oxford University Press 2011) [hereinafter 
CREATION]; WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Harvard University Press 2003) 
[hereinafter ECONOMIC STRUCTURE]). 
15 See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (“The 
qualities of those bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of 
metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . manifestations of 
laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”); Joshua D. 
Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History And Theory, 63 HASTINGS 
L.J. 53, 57–58 (2011) (“The patent system is not supposed to reward discoveries of 
basic science and at least some other kinds of human discoveries, no matter how 
much money, effort, creativity and disclosure went into developing and 
disseminating that highly useful knowledge.”); Allen K. Yu, Within Subject Matter 
Eligibility—A Disease And A Cure, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 387, 428 (2011) (“The Court 
should redefine its vague and relatively weak judicial prohibition against the 
patenting of nature and abstract ideas in terms of a stronger, more explicit 
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 Part II of this article shows that the words “invention,” “new,” and 
“useful” in 35 U.S.C. § 101 are consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
exclusion of physical phenomena and laws of nature from patent 
enclosure.16 Part II also shows that the term “new” in § 101 and in earlier 
statutes has retained for over 200 years a different meaning than “novelty” 
and “prior art” in §§ 102 and 103. The exclusions of physical phenomena 
and laws of nature are therefore not the results of a judicially active court 
limiting the will of Congress. 
 Part III.A of this article analyzes the three conflicting opinions in 
the Federal Circuit’s 2012 Myriad Genetics decision. Part III.B argues that 
the conclusion of Judges Lourie and Moore—that the isolated DNA 
segments of Claim 1 constitute patentable subject matter—disregards the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Prometheus, Diamond v. Chakrabarty,17 and 
Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.18 Part III.C argues that even 
if the isolated cDNA segments of Claim 2 do not fit within the guidance of 
Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers, the isolated cDNA segments under 
Prometheus cover an unpatentable law of nature—the genetic code.  
 This article concludes that the Federal Circuit’s disregard in Myriad 
Genetics of the laws of nature and the requirement of an inventive concept 
where the patent claims focus on laws of nature allows enclosure of the 
building blocks of nature that should instead remain part of the public 
domain. 
I. PATENT LAW AND EXCLUSIONS FROM PATENTABLE SUBJECT 
MATTER 
A. Foundations of Patent Law 
Patents are restrictions on competition imposed by the federal 
government.19 The constitutional basis for patents is Article I, § 8, clause 8 
                                                                                                                         
prohibition against the patenting of ‘basic tools of scientific and technological 
work.’” (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). 
16 See, e.g., Efthimios Parasidis, A Uniform Framework For Patent Eligibility, 85 
TUL. L. REV. 323, 339 (2010) (“[N]atural principles may not receive patent 
protection because, under the terms of the patent statute, they can never be deemed 
new.”). For a discussion of the enclosure of what had been held in common in 
England, see JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF 
THE MIND 43–53 (Yale University Press 2008) (“Enclosure did not necessarily 
mean physical fencing, though that could happen. More likely, the previously 
common land was converted into private property, generally controlled by a single 
landholder.”). 
17 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204, 2207–12 (1980). 
18 333 U.S. at 130. 
19 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) provides, “Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the 
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of the U.S. Constitution (the “Patent Clause”). It grants Congress the power 
“[t]o promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective . . . 
Discoveries . . . .”20 The statutory basis for patents is 35 U.S.C. § 101, 
which provides, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.”21 The Supreme Court refers to 
these categories (process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, and 
improvement thereof) as patentable subject matter.22 
Even though the Supreme Court has said Congress intended courts 
to give patent statutes “wide scope,”23 for over 150 years the Court has 
                                                                                                                         
patentee . . . of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or 
selling the invention throughout the United States . . . .” Professor Lessig observed, 
“A patent is a form of governmental regulation. It is a state-backed monopoly 
granting exclusive rights to an ‘inventor’ for an invention deemed useful, novel, 
and nonobvious.” LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE 
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 205 (Random House 2001). In Precision 
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 
(1945), the Supreme Court said that “a patent is an exception to the general rule 
against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and open market.” 
20 The complete text of clause 8 is, “To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries” (capitalization as in original). Although 
not apparent from first reading, “useful arts”, “inventors” and “discoveries” are the 
words grating the authority for patents, and “science”, “authors” and “writings” are 
the words granting the authority for copyrights. See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, 
TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND 
ADMINISTRATION, 1793–836, at 19 (1998) (“[T]he intellectual property clause 
clearly encompassed two separate powers packaged together; one to promote the 
progress of science, i.e., knowledge, through the exclusive grant known as a 
copyright, and the other to promote the progress of useful arts through the exclusive 
grant known as a patent.”). See also DONALD S. CHISUM, 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS 
OV-2, OV-3, 1-6, 1-7; R. CARL MOY, 1 MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1.11 (4th 
ed.). 
21 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2002) (emphasis added). For examples of 35 U.S.C.'s 
conditions and requirements, see 35 U.S.C. § 102 (novelty), 103 (nonobvious 
subject matter) and 112 (specification). 
22 Kewanee Oil v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974). Regardless of whether 
or not the claimed invention meets the other criteria for a patent, an individual 
cannot obtain a patent unless the invention “falls within one of the express 
categories of patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101”. Id.; see also Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). 
23 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). The Court in Chakrabarty 
noted that committee reports on the 1952 Patent Act informed the Court, “Congress 
intended statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made by 
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consistently identified boundaries to patentable subject matter: “laws of 
nature”, “physical” or “natural phenomena”24 and “abstract ideas” are not 
patentable.25 Addressing these boundaries, Professor Eileen Kane has 
explained that “[t]he underlying rationale for the exclusions is that scientific 
advances depend on an available substrate of basic knowledge, and that, 
therefore, patenting the intellectual foundations of a field has an adverse 
effect on its progress.”26  As a result of these exclusions, what might 
otherwise fit within the statutory definitions of “process,” “composition of 
matter,” “manufacture,” or “machine” is not patentable if the proposed 
patent effectively claims a law of nature, a physical phenomenon, or an 
abstract idea.27  
                                                                                                                         
man.’” 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 2399 (1952)). However, 
the Supreme Court clearly limited that general statement by the exclusions the 
Court repeated in Chakrabarty, that the laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas are not patentable. Id. For additional views that the quote from the 
committee report was more limited, see Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3248–49 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., concurring); Oskar Liivak, The Forgotten Originality Requirement: A 
Constitutional Hurdle for Gene Patents, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 261, 
279–281 (2005); 1 WALKER, supra note 20, § 5:1, at 5–8 (“[W]hile both Congress 
and the courts have stated that the statutory language of section 101 encompasses 
‘anything under the sun that is made by man,’ . . . this is decidedly not the case. 
Instead, the authorities have agreed that certain types of activity are non-statutory 
subject matter, even where the particular subject matter at hand could be described 
nominally in the terms of section 101 as, for example, a process or an article of 
manufacture.”). 
24 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225 (referring to the three exceptions to patentable 
subject matter under § 101 as “laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract 
ideas.”) In Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981), the Court referred to 
“natural phenomena” as unpatentable; in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 
(1972), the Court referred to “Phenomena of nature” as unpatentable; and in Parker 
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978), the Court referred to “Phenomena of nature” as 
unpatentable. The Court has used those terms—physical phenomena and natural 
phenomena—interchangeably. This article generally uses “physical phenomena” 
instead of “natural phenomena,” to try to better distinguish between physical matter 
found in nature (physical phenomena) and relationships inherent in nature (laws of 
nature), although frequently the lines are not clear. 
25 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (citing Parker, 437 U.S. at 584; Gottschalk, 409 
U.S. at 67; Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); 
O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–21 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 
U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852)). 
26 Eileen M. Kane, Patenting Genes and Genetic Methods: What's At Stake?, 6 J. 
BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 4–5 (2011). 
27 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226 (“Any suggestion in this Court’s case law that the 
Patent Act’s terms deviate from their ordinary meaning has only been an 
explanation for the exceptions for laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas.”). In Bilski, the Supreme Court limited the meaning of “process” to avoid the 
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Of course, nothing made by humans can flout laws of nature, and 
all physical objects must be derived in part from products found in nature.28  
However, humans did not invent laws of nature or physical phenomena, so 
these are not “new.”29 Courts must draw lines for determining the difference 
between (1) unpatentable laws of nature or physical phenomena and (2) 
patentable applications of those unpatentable elements.30  
In its 2012 decision in Myriad Genetics, the Federal Circuit said, 
without reference to any research or Supreme Court precedents supporting 
its view, that “patents on life-saving material and processes, involving large 
amounts of risky investment, would seem to be precisely the types of 
subject matter that should be subject to the incentives of exclusive rights.”31 
Yet scientists provided empirical evidence to the U.S. Government in 2010 
that patents on basic genetic discoveries had not increased basic genetic 
research and had probably harmed the availability of genetic testing.32 Legal 
scholars have likewise argued that the aggressive patenting of basic research 
encouraged by federal legislation and case law did not in fact further the 
                                                                                                                         
issuance of a patent for an abstract idea. Id. at 3229–31. This article focuses on 
laws of nature and physical phenomena rather than abstract ideas, since those are 
the exclusions applicable to patents for isolated DNA segments.  
28 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 
(2012) (“For all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply 
laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.”); ROBIN FELDMAN, 
RETHINKING PATENT LAW 96 (2012) (“All inventions to some extent rely on and 
use laws of nature, laws of physics, and other natural phenomena.”); Parasidis, 
supra note 16, at 327. 
29 See infra Part II.C. The basis for and the application of the abstract ideas 
exclusion to many cases and different fact situations is beyond the scope of this 
article, although this article discusses some Supreme Court cases on abstract ideas, 
because they shed light on the importance the Supreme Court has placed on the 
exclusions from patentable subject matter. 
30 See, e.g., Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1293–94 (“[A]n application of a law of nature 
or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of 
patent protection.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 
187 (1981))). 
31 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 689 F.3d 1303, 1324 
(Fed. Cir. 2012). 
32 Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and Society, 
Gene Patents and Licensing Practices and Their Impact on Patient Access to 
Genetic Tests, OFFICE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY ACTIVITIES (April 2010), available at 
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACGHS_patents_report_2010.pdf. The 
Roster and Ex Officio Members of SACGHS are listed at pp. i–iv. Specifically, the 
Chair of the SACGHS Report concluded, “The substantial number of existing 
patents on genes and methods of diagnosis also pose a threat to the development of 
multiplex testing, parallel sequencing, and whole-genomic sequencing, the areas of 
genetic testing with the greatest potential future benefits.” Id. at cover letter. 
No. 2] DUKE LAW & TECH REVIEW 442  
 
economic goal of developing new products.33 Furthermore, some 
economists have argued that intellectual property laws, including patent 
law, “does not increase either innovation or creation. They are an 
unnecessary evil.”34 At a minimum, there is controversy over the effect of 
patents on innovation in basic research.35 
The statute on subject matter patentability, however, has remained 
strikingly similar since 1790. Since 1793, the statute has required that in 
order to be patentable, the claimant must have “invented a new and useful 
. . . machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”36 As a result, 
                                                      
33 Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights And 
The Norms Of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 115 (1999). Professor Rai was 
referring particularly to the Bayh-Dole Act codified as 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212, 
Chakrabarty, and Diehr. 
34 MICHELLE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY 7 
(2010). Boldrin and Levine do not argue for the immediate elimination of 
intellectual property laws, acknowledging that “a sudden elimination of intellectual 
property laws may bring about collateral damages of an intolerable magnitude . . . 
[A]bolition must be approached by smaller steps . . . .” Id. at 244–45. With respect 
to pharmaceutical innovation, they argue that, “[f]ar from encouraging great new 
health and life-saving products, the [patent] system instead produces too much 
innovation and expense of the wrong kind—me-too drugs to get around the other 
guy’s patents and get a share of a lucrative market . . . .” Id. at 238. On the other 
hand, there is much scholarly support for the proposition that patents increase 
innovation. See, e.g., 1 MOY, supra note 20, at § 1:39, 1–82 (“The favored 
explanation for the patent system in the United States is that it creates an incentive 
for persons to engage in inventive activity.”); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and 
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). 
35 See, e.g., STEPHEN A. HANSEN ET AL., AMERICAN ASSOC. FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXPERIENCES IN THE 
UNITED STATES SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY 7 (2007), available at 
http://sippi.aaas.org/Pubs/SIPPI_US_IP_Survey.pdf; ROBERT P. MERGES, 
JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3 (2011) (“I simply cannot justify our current 
IP [both copyright and patent] system on the basis of verifiable data showing that 
people are better off with IP law than they would be without it.”); Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1098 (2008) 
(reviewing various empirical studies and concluding that “[s]urvey results from 
scientists suggest that, although commercial scientists face more obstacles from 
intellectual property than academic scientists, in both settings it is rare for an 
ongoing project to be stopped because of patents . . . . On the other hand, scientists 
in both academic and commercial laboratories report more problems in gaining 
access to ‘practically excludable’ resources such as tangible materials and data that 
they cannot readily duplicate in their own laboratories.”). 
36 Section 1 of the Patent Act of 1790 provided for the grant of a patent to “any 
person or persons . . . [who] hath or have invented or discovered any useful art, 
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before 
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Supreme Court cases from the 1800s and 1900s interpreting the predecessor 
to current § 101 remain important today, especially in light of the common 
law tradition of interpreting patentable subject matter.37 
B. Supreme Court Decisions Prior to Chakrabarty 
In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court examined what must 
be free from patents for all to use. In LeRoy v. Tatham, the Court held, “[a] 
principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; 
                                                                                                                         
known or used . . . if they [any two of the Secretary of State, Secretary of the 
Department of War and Attorney General] shall deem the invention or discovery 
sufficiently useful and important . . . .” 9 CHISUM, supra note 20, at App. 9-1. 
Section 1 of the Patent Act of 1793 provided for the grant of a patent to any 
person(s) who “have invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine 
manufacture or composition of matter, not known or used before the 
application . . . .” The 1793 Patent Act, however, eliminated the requirement that 
the invention be deemed “sufficiently useful and important.” Id., App. 10-1; 1 
CHISUM, supra note 20, at OV-3. Section 6 of the Patent Act of 1836 provided for a 
patent to “any person or persons having discovered or invented any new and useful 
art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not 
known or used by others before his or their discovery of invention thereof . . . .” 9 
CHISUM, supra note 20, at App. 11-3. Section 24 of the Patent Act of 1870 had 
essentially identical language on the basic requirements, although there were other 
modifications to the requirements. The requirement of “invent”, “new” and “useful” 
was continued in the Patent Act of 1952, although that Act substituted “process” for 
“art.” Id. at App. 19-7. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) defines “process” to mean “process, art 
or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, 
composition of matter, or material.”  
37 Cf. Peter S. Menell, Forty Years Of Wandering In The Wilderness And No Closer 
To The Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism And The Missed 
Opportunity To Return Patent Law To Its Technology Mooring, 63 STAN. L. REV. 
1289, 1314 (2011) (“[P]atentable subject matter cannot evolve to meet the new 
challenges of the new information age without integrating eighteenth-, nineteenth-, 
and twentieth-century sources of patentable subject matter into a flexible and 
evolving body of common law that is sensitive to history, statutory evolution, 
constitutional constraints, and understanding of modern science and technology. 
This will be particularly important as courts confront the patentability of DNA 
compounds, diagnostic tests and unforeseeable information age innovations.”); 
Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms And The Common Law Of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 
51, 53, 108 (2010) (“[T]he patent code, much like the Sherman Act, is a common 
law enabling statute . . . . For more than two hundred years the courts have 
navigated the contours of the patent system, adeptly construing doctrine and 
interpreting elliptical statutory phrases . . . This accretive process . . . possesses 
comparative advantages to congressional enactments.”). 
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these cannot be patented . . . .”38 In O'Reilly v. Morse, the Court explained 
its rejection of Morse’s claim to electro-magnetism with the following 
analogy: “No one, we suppose, will maintain that Fulton could have taken 
out a patent for his invention of propelling vessels by steam, describing the 
process and machinery he used, and claimed under it the exclusive right to 
use the motive power of the steam.”39 In American Wood Paper Co. v. 
Fibre Disintegrating Co., the Supreme Court rejected a patent for cellulose 
“isolated” from nature and held that “the manufacture claimed as novel is 
not a new composition of matter, but an extract obtained by the 
decomposition or disintegration of material substances.”40 Finally, in 
Cochrane v. Badische Anlin & Soda Farik, the Supreme Court rejected a 
patent for a synthetically made dye, alizarine, that had previously been 
made by isolating dye from the root of the madder plant, characterizing the 
claimed invention as “an old article” and noting that “[c]alling it artificial 
alizarine did not make it a new composition of matter, and patentable.”41  
What do these nineteenth century cases suggest? The Court has 
long recognized that patents could not issue for fundamental principles or 
truths42 or products that existed in nature.43  Further, simply claiming what 
nature does is not patentable.44 While the Court established no clear formula 
                                                      
38 Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852). Tatham involved a patent for 
machinery for making pipes and tubes from metallic substances. Id. at 156. 
39 O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112–13 (1853). The Court upheld Samuel 
Morse’s invention of the telegraph, but rejected as “too broad” his eighth claim 
for the “use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call 
electro-magnetism, however developed for marking or printing intelligible 
characters, signs, or letters, at any distances . . . .” Id. 
40 Am. Wood Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. 566, 593, 596 (1874). 
The case specifically involved “a pulp suitable for the manufacture of paper, made 
from wood or other vegetable substances, by boiling the wood or other vegetable 
substance in . . . alkali.” Id. at 577. It is apparent that the structure of the wood pulp 
claimed was different than the structure of cellulose found in nature. There 
separately was a process claim at issue. Id. at 593, 596–97. The Court said, “It is 
insisted . . . that the paper-pulp which had been produced before . . . was not pure 
cellulose, . . . and from this it is argued that the pure article obtained from wood by 
[the inventor’s] . . . process is a different and new product, or manufacture.” Id. at 
594. Whether or not the wood pulp produced by the patentee in fact was pure 
cellulose, the Court proceeded on the assumption it was. Id. at 596. 
41 Cochrane v. Badische, 111 U.S. 293, 311 (1884). FELDMAN, supra note 28, at 
328 n.193, refers to this view of the case as “effectively dictum.” This is incorrect, 
however, because the Court did not choose between the two views of the case 
expressed in the opinion, but concluded, “In either view the decree of the circuit 
court must be reversed . . . .” Cochrane, 111 U.S. at 313. 
42 Tatham, 55 U.S. at 175. 
43 Am. Wood Paper, 90 U.S. at 593, 596. 
44 The eighth claim in O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112–13 (1853). 
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for determining patent eligibility, the mere fact that humans synthetically 
made a product45 or isolated it from nature46 did not guarantee that the 
product constituted patentable subject matter. Instead, there must be 
different characteristics and uses in the claimed product than existed with 
the natural product.47  
The Supreme Court cases in the twentieth century continued to 
recognize these limits on patentable subject matter when the patent claims 
focused on laws of nature or products found in nature. For instance, the 
Supreme Court rejected in American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co. a 
patent for “[f]resh citrus fruit of which the rind or skin carries borax in 
amount . . . sufficient to render the fruit resistant to blue mold decay.”48 The 
Supreme Court explained, “There is no change in the name, appearance, or 
general character of the fruit. It remains a fresh orange, fit only for the same 
beneficial uses as theretofore.”49  
In 1948, the Supreme Court invalidated in Funk Brothers Seed Co. 
v. Kalo Inoculant Co. a patent for a combination of bacteria for leguminous 
plants mixed in a powder or liquid base and packaged for sale.50 Different 
bacteria promoted growth in different legumes, but when mixed together, 
the experience had been that the different bacteria inhibited the positive 
growth effects of each other on the legumes.51 The inventor had discovered 
that certain bacteria could be mixed together without the inhibiting effect, 
and so he sold to the public packages containing a mixture of certain 
bacteria (presumably a mixture not found in nature) for use with different 
species of legumes.52  The Court held that the inventor “does not create state 
of inhibition or of non-inhibition in the bacteria . . . [and] patents cannot 
                                                      
45 Cochrane, 111 U.S. at 311. 
46 Am. Wood Paper, 90 U.S. at 593, 596. 
47 Id. 
48 Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 6 (1931). 
49 Id. at 11–12. See Kane, supra note 26, at 13 (“[T]he Supreme Court decided that 
the addition of borax to the rind of an orange to increase its longevity did not confer 
a patentable distinction, when compared to an unadulterated orange, to create an 
article of manufacture . . . .”). 
50 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 129, 132 (1948). The 
issue in Funk Bros. was not “whether the methods of selecting and testing the non-
inhibitive strains are patentable.” Id. at 130 (emphasis added). The case concerned 
only product claims. What the Court described as illustrative was the following 
claim: “An inoculant for leguminous plants comprising a plurality of selected 
mutually non-inhibitive strains of different species of bacteria of the genus 
Rhizobium, said strains being unaffected by each other in respect to their ability to 
fix nitrogen in the leguminous plant for which they are specific.” Id. at 127 n.1. 
51 Id. at 129. 
52 Id.  
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issue for the discovery of the phenomena of nature.”53 The Court added that 
“[t]he qualities of those bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the 
qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . 
manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to 
none.”54  The mixing of the bacteria in a powder or liquid base thus did not 
render the bacteria patentable. 
In 1966, in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,55 a case 
involving a patent for an improvement in a clamp for plows, the Supreme 
Court again emphasized, “Congress may not authorize the issuance of 
patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public 
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”56 It 
cautioned that “[t]his is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it 
may not be ignored.”57  
In the fifteen years after Graham, the Court restated in a number of 
cases the same principle—patents cannot remove from the public domain 
information and material already available to the public. For instance, in 
1972, in Gottschalk v. Benson,58 the Supreme Court said that “[p]henomena 
of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual 
concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work.”59 In 1978, the Supreme Court held in Parker v. Flook60 
                                                      
53 Id. at 130. 
54 Id. For a discussion of conflicting interpretations of Funk Brothers, see John M. 
Conley & Robert Makowski, Back to the Future: Rethinking the Product of Nature 
Doctrine as a Barrier to Biotechnology Patents (Part II), 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 301, 330–34 (2003). Professor Conley and Dr. Makowski conclude that 
“[a] fairer characterization of the holding is that Bond failed because his real and 
only discovery was the product of nature, which he applied in only the most 
obvious way possible: exactly as he found it. In other words, his patent was denied 
because his purported ‘application’ was not materially distinguishable from the 
work of nature.” Id. at 334. 
55 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
56 Id. at 6. The Court was not considering the three exemptions from patentable 
subject matter in Graham, but this statement of a “non-removal” principle is a 
compelling rationale for the exclusions of laws of nature and physical phenomena 
from patentable subject matter.  
57 Id. Allen Yu argues that “subject matter eligibility is more than just a substantive 
patentability requirement, it is fundamentally a constitutional requirement touching 
upon the very existential reasons for having a patent system.” Yu, supra note 15, at 
425.  
58 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
59 Id. at 67. As set forth above in notes 29–30 and accompanying text, it is easy to 
understand that physical phenomena and natural laws are not new, although humans 
may only recently have discovered them. It may be more difficult to categorize 
certain abstract ideas as previously available to the public. As mentioned in note 27, 
supra, a detailed analysis of the relationship between the abstract ideas exclusion 
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that a patent using an algorithm to adjust alarm limits during catalytic 
conversion—without the addition of an inventive concept—was invalid.61  
As the Court explained, “Even though a phenomenon of nature or 
mathematical formula may be well known, an inventive application of the 
principle may be patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon 
cannot support a patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its 
application.”62   
American Fruit Growers, Funk Brothers, Graham, Gottschalk, and 
Flook exclude from patentable subject matter products and fundamental 
principles that exist in nature, whether or not humans had discovered them 
before the claimed invention. Further, mere practical applications of such 
principles cannot transform unpatentable truths into patentable subject 
matter. American Fruit Growers and Funk Brothers also support the 
principle that, in determining whether a composition constitutes patentable 
subject matter, a court must consider not only whether the specific 
composition is found in nature, but also whether the human intervention 
significantly changed the functioning of the composition.  
C. Chakrabarty, Diehr, and Bilski 
In Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court first addressed whether living 
matter (specifically, living matter created by inserting at least two plasmids 
into the cell of a bacteria to significantly change the functioning of the 
bacteria) constituted patentable subject matter under § 101.63   The sole 
                                                                                                                         
and § 101 is beyond the scope of this article, since the composition claims of 
Myriad Genetics do not raise the issue of abstract ideas. 
60 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
61 Id. at 590–94. 
62 Id. at 594 (emphasis added). Earlier in the opinion, the Court said, “[w]hether the 
algorithm was in fact known or unknown at the time of the claimed invention, as 
one of the ‘basic tools of scientific and technological work’ . . . it is treated as 
though it were a familiar part of the prior art.” Id. (quoting Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 
67). This phrase, “treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art,” has 
provoked controversy—apart from the holding in the case. 
63 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980) (“We granted certiorari to 
determine whether a live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter 
. . . .”). Of course, the humans did not create the life in the bacteria or the plasmids, 
but inserted living plasmids into living bacteria. The Supreme Court explained, 
“Plasmids are hereditary units physically separate from the chromosomes of the 
cell. In prior research, Chakrabarty and an associate discovered that plasmids 
control the oil degradation abilities of certain bacteria. In particular, the two 
researchers discovered plasmids capable of degrading camphor and octane, two 
components of crude oil. In the work represented by the patent application at issue 
here, Chakrabarty discovered a process by which four different plasmids, capable 
of degrading four different oil components, could be transferred to and maintained 
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issue in Chakrabarty was whether the enhanced bacteria constituted 
patentable subject matter under § 101.64 To resolve the issue, the Court 
noted that it must determine whether the micro-organism constitutes a 
manufacture or composition of matter.65 Though the Court first adopted 
broad definitions of “manufacture”66 and “composition of matter,”67 it also 
recognized that laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are 
excluded from patentable subject matter.68  
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court held that “the patentee has 
produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any 
found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility. His 
discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is 
patentable subject matter under § 101.”69 The Court explained that the 
plasmid-enhanced bacteria were capable of degrading multiple components 
of crude oil, a use possessed by no naturally occurring bacteria, and 
therefore had significant value for the treatment of oil spills.70  
As in American Wood Paper, American Fruit Growers, and Funk 
Bros., the Court in Chakrabarty compared  (1) the physical characteristics 
of the invention to what had been found in nature (the plasmid-enhanced 
bacteria compared to natural bacterium) and (2) the functioning of the 
invention to what had been found in nature (the plasmid-enhanced bacteria 
did degrade crude oil, whereas natural bacteria did not).71 The Court said 
                                                                                                                         
stably in a single Pseudomonas bacterium, which itself has no capacity for 
degrading oil.” Id. at 305 n.1. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 307. Finding patentable subject matter, the Court did not state whether the 
bacteria was a manufacture or a composition of matter. Id. at 307–09. 
66 Id. at 308 (quoting Am. Fruit Growers, 283 U.S. at 11). 
67 Id. (quoting Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280 (D.D.C.1957)). 
68 Id. at 309 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 
409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 
130 (1948); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–21 (1853); Le Roy v. 
Tatham, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 156, 175 (1852)). 
69 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310 (emphasis added). The Court did not discuss a 
standard for determining “markedly different.“ 
70 Id. at 304. Professor Rai observed that Chakrabarty “heralded a more favorable 
attitude towards patents” and that subsequently the Federal Circuit significantly 
strengthened patent rights. See Rai, supra note 33, at 101. 
71 For a detailed discussion of Chakrabarty, see John M. Conley & Roberte 
Makowski, Back To The Future: Rethinking The Product Of Nature Doctrine As A 
Barrier To Biotechnology Patents (Part II), 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
301, 371–76 (April 2003). Professor Conley and Dr. Makowski state that it is clear 
in Chakrabarty that the Court considered Funk Brothers good law. Id. at 376. They 
also wrote that the “principal distinction” between Funk Brothers and Chakrabarty 
“appears to be that the Funk inventor did his work by mixing cells, whereas 
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that the relevant distinction “was not between living and inanimate things, 
but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made 
inventions.”72 The Court did not address the standard for determining 
patentable subject matter, which tests (a) if humans had subtracted elements 
from a product found in nature, or (b) if humans had created a synthetic 
copy of what existed in nature.73  
Just a year later, in Diamond v. Diehr,74 the Supreme Court upheld 
a patent that was drawn to applications of an unpatentable formula in an 
industrial setting.75 The Court declared, “While a scientific truth, or the 
mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and 
useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may 
be,”76 when it transforms an article to a different state or thing.77 The Court 
held the patent constituted patentable subject matter because it did not view 
the claims as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula but rather to 
cover an industrial process in molding rubber products.78  
In 2010, the Supreme Court in Bilski rejected a process “for 
instructing buyers and sellers how to protect against the risk of price 
fluctuations in a discrete section of the economy.”79  The Court repeated the 
principles established in Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers that “laws of 
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas” are “part of the storehouse 
of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to 
                                                                                                                         
Chakrabarty had to introduce new genetic material within a cell.” Id. Although that 
explains the difference in the comparison of chemical compositions, the Supreme 
Court clearly considered the additional function of the plasmid-enhanced bacteria 
as a significant distinction from the natural bacteria. 
72 Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313. Subsequently in J.E.M. Ag. Supply v. Pioneer Hi-
Bred Int’l, Inc., the Supreme Court confirmed that the distinction the Court 
considered crucial under § 101 was between “products of nature, whether living or 
not, and human-made inventions,” and held that the Plant Variety Protection Act 
and the Plant Patent Act of 1930 were not the exclusive means of obtaining a patent 
for human-developed plant breeds. 534 U.S. 124, 130 (2001) (quoting Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. at 313). 
73 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
74 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 188 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
77 Id. at 192. 
78 Id. at 192–93. For a criticism of the Court’s decision in Diehr, see Sarnoff, supra 
note 15, at 77 (“Diehr, like Benson, thus imposed needless confusion by permitting 
the creativity of the ineligible discovery to contribute directly to the eligibility of a 
claimed application without considering whether there was any additional creativity 
in the application itself.”). 
79 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010). 
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none.”80 The Court then emphasized that these exceptions were consistent 
with the requirement that to be patentable, a process must be “new and 
useful.”81 As Professors Demaine and Fellmeth have pointed out, “By its 
plain terms, the requirement that an invention be ‘new’ requires that the 
claimed product or process must not have previously existed in nature.”82  
In his concurring opinion in Bilski,83 Justice Breyer stated that he 
summarized the views of all the Justices when noting the Court has long 
held “[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and 
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable” under § 101.84 He further 
emphasized that “allowing individuals to patent these fundamental 
principles would “wholly pre-empt” the public’s access to the “basic tools 
of scientific and technological work.”85 Justice Breyer likewise observed 
that “[t]he Court has thus been careful in interpreting the Patent Act to 
‘determine not only what is protected, but also what is free for all to use.’”86  
The following section examines in detail the Supreme Court’s next 
decision on patentable subject matter, Prometheus. This unanimous decision 
sets forth further guidance on what is free for all to use and should guide the 
outcome in Myriad Genetics. 
D. Prometheus 
1. Background 
Prometheus centered on the validity of patents for diagnosing the 
use of thiopurine drugs in the treatment of certain diseases.87 The legal issue 
                                                      
80 Id. at 3225 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Funk 
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)). 
81 Id. at 3225. 
82 Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: a 
Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 303, 386 (2002). See Part II.C, infra, for further discussion of “new” in 
§ 101. 
83 Justice Scalia concurred in the part of Justice Breyer’s opinion discussed in this 
paragraph. 
84 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3258 (Breyer, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). 
85 Id. (quoting Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 67).  
86 Id. at 3258 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 
141, 151 (1989)). 
88 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294–96 
(2012). The representative claim quoted by the Court was the following claim 1 of 
U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 ('623 Patent): “A method of optimizing therapeutic 
efficacy for treatment of an immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, comprising: 
(a) administering a drug providing 6–thioguanine to a subject having said immune-
mediated gastrointestinal disorder; and (b) determining the level of 6–thioguanine 
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revolved around the inherent reaction of human bodies to synthetic 
chemicals inserted into the body. Scientists had known that the levels of 
certain metabolites88 of thiopurine drugs were correlated to the effectiveness 
or harm of the drug in individuals, but they had not known the precise 
correlations.89 Prometheus’s patent claims “identified these correlations 
with some precision” and added that the result of the process indicated a 
need to decrease (or increase) the level of thiopurine drug administered.90 
Given this, a doctor using the Mayo Collaborative Services test (a slightly 
different test than specified by the patent) could violate the patent even if 
she did not actually alter her treatment decision.91  
Confirming its precedents, the Supreme Court cited five of its 
earlier decisions going back to 1854 as the foundation for its statement that 
“‘laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas’ are not 
patentable.”92 The Court likewise reiterated that such subjects were not 
                                                                                                                         
in said subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder, wherein the 
level of 6–thioguanine less than about 230 pmol per 8x10 8 red blood cells indicates 
a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently administered to said 
subject and wherein the level of 6–thioguanine greater than about 400 pmol per 
8x10 red blood cells indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug 
subsequently administered to said subject.” Id. at 1295 (citation omitted). The claim 
used the word “method,” but the Court used “process” to describe the claim at 
issue. Id. The Supreme Court noted, “[t]he District Court found that Mayo's test 
infringed claim 7 of the '623 patent. . . . The number Mayo used (450) was too close 
to the number the claim used (400) to matter given appropriate margins of error.” 
Id. at 1296 (citation omitted). 
88 “Metabolism” is the “sum total of biochemical reactions carried out by an 
organism.” H. ROBERT HORTON ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF BIOCHEMISTRY 819 (4th ed. 
2006) [hereinafter BIOCHEMISTRY]. A “metabolite” is an “intermediate in the 
synthesis of degradation of biopolymers and their component units.” Id. A 
“biopolymer” is a “biological macromolecule in which many identical or similar 
small molecules are covalently linked to one another to form a long chain. Proteins, 
polysaccharides, and nucleic acids are biopolymers.” Id. at 812.  
89 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1295. The Court also noted that individuals 
metabolized thiopurine drugs differently. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1296. Prometheus was not the inventor, but the “sole and exclusive licensee 
of the patents” who sold “diagnostic tests that embody the processes the patents 
describe.” Id. at 1295. Prometheus sued Mayo Collaborative Services for 
administering a test using a slightly different correlation. See supra note 87. 
92 Id. at 1293 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3233–34 (2010); Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 
156, 175 (1852); O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112–20 (1853)). The 
Supreme Court also cited Neilson v. Harford, Webster’s Patent Cases 295, 371 
(1841) (an English patent case). Diehr, Bilski, and Harford involved process 
claims, whereas Chakrabarty and Tatham involved product claims. Morse involved 
both product and process claims. Except for the earlier Federal Circuit decisions in 
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patentable, as they formed the basis for scientific and technological 
research.93 The Court also repeated the refrain that “monopolization of those 
tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more 
than it would tend to promote it.”94 
The Supreme Court in Prometheus recognized a continuum from 
unpatentable laws of nature to patentable applications, observing that 
“[w]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a 
patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of 
knowledge of scientific truth may be.”95 The Court cautioned, however, that 
in order to be patentable, “one must do more than simply state the law of 
nature while adding the words ‘apply it.’”96 
The Supreme Court listed the following considerations for 
interpreting the validity of patent applications that focus on a law of nature: 
• Is the claim simply a draftsman’s trick to circumvent 
the prohibition against patenting laws of nature;97 
• Would the claim—if approved—“too broadly 
preempt” a law of nature;98  
• Does the claim have an element evidencing an 
“inventive concept” beyond the law of nature;99 and  
• Is any element in addition to the law of nature simply 
an attempt to limit the use of the law of nature to a 
particular technological environment or insignificant 
activity after determining how the law of nature 
                                                                                                                         
Prometheus, the Court did not cite a single Federal Circuit case as precedent. The 
Prometheus Court referred to these four items as an “important implicit exception” 
to 35 U.S.C. § 101. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1293. Since the statutory requirement 
that claimed subject matter must have been invented by the applicant and must be 
new (see II-B and C of this article) is fully consistent with the law of nature and 
phenomena of nature “exclusion,” this article refers to these principles as 
exclusions rather than exceptions. Whether the “abstract idea” exception is also 
inherently a part of the language of § 101 is a separate question beyond the scope of 
this article.  
93 Id. 
94 Id.  
95 Id. at 1294 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (1981)) (citations omitted). It also 
said, “all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of 
nature, natural phenomena or abstract ideas.” Id. at 1293. 
96 Id. at 1294 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972)). 
97 Id. (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)). 
98 Id. (citing O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. at 112–20; Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72). 
99 Id. (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 594). The Court used the word “inventive” five 
times. See id. at 1294, 1299, 1300, 1305. 
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applied in the situation described.100  
The Court found101 that: (1) the steps in the processes at issue (apart 
from the natural laws themselves) “involve well-understood, routine, 
conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field.”102 
and (2) “the patents would risk disproportionately tying up the use of the 
underlying natural laws, inhibiting their use in the making of further 
discoveries.”103 
2. Holding in Prometheus 
Part II of the Court’s decision started by identifying the law of 
nature covered by the claim: the “relationships between concentrations of 
certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a dosage of a 
thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm.”104 The Court then 
                                                      
100 Id. at 1294 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010); Diehr, 450 
U.S. at 191–92). 
101 The Court said, “[w]e find that the process claims at issue here do not satisfy 
these conditions.” Id. It is apparent the Court was referring there to a legal finding 
or conclusion, rather than a finding of fact. Patentable subject matter is a question 
of law, subject to underlying factual questions. See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 
975 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 
F.2d 1053, 1055–56 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  
102 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.  
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1296. The conclusion that the correlation is a law of nature has not gone 
unchallenged. See, e.g., Denise DeFranco, Mayo, A Force to Be Reckoned With, 4 
LANDSLIDE, 24, 24, 27 (July–Aug. 2012) (“Because there is no law of nature 
concerning a precisely ‘correct’ concentration for a nonharmful, yet therapeutic, 
effect, the Prometheus patent expressed the discovery as a range of 
concentrations.”). It is not clear what the basis is for Ms. DeFranco concluding 
“there is no law of nature concerning a precisely ‘correct’ concentration.” How 
does Ms. DeFranco, or anyone, know? Moreover, whether or not it is a law of 
nature or physical phenomena, the patentee claimed it is. The claimed correlation 
might not be exactly correct, but if the patent had been upheld, it would have 
prevented Mayo from using its test, which test used a slightly different correlation, 
and which might have been a more correct correlation. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 
1296. The Supreme Court has not limited the exclusion of claims of laws of nature 
to accurate claims. Inaccurate claims could have just as harmful effects on 
innovation as accurate claims, and limiting the exclusion to accurate claims could 
make the exclusion impossible to administer. See, e.g., Anita Krishnakumar, 
Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical and 
Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 251 (2010) (“[T]he opinions authored 
by Justices Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, Kennedy, and Alito exhibited the highest rates 
of reliance for interpretive tools that promote legal-landscape coherence—that is, 
other statutes, the dictionary rule, and practical consequences emphasizing 
administrabilty-based concerns.”). Inventors could claim a slightly “inaccurate” 
correlation and nevertheless argue that a court enjoin the accurate correlation/claim. 
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posed the question whether the claims added enough to the relationships to 
constitute patentable applications.105 It explained that there must be 
“additional features that provide practical assurance that the process is more 
than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.”106  
The Supreme Court examined each step separately and in the 
aggregate, and held that the steps were “not sufficient to transform 
unpatentable natural correlations into patentable applications” of the law of 
nature.107 It concluded that the “administering step” did not add anything to 
the law of nature, because it referred to doctors who by definition were 
already treating patients with thiopurine drugs.108  The Court also noted that 
the two “wherein” steps did not add anything to the law of nature because 
they were “at most . . . a suggestion that he should take those laws into 
account when treating his patient.”109 The “determining step” did not limit 
the doctors in any way, because they could “determine the level of the 
relevant metabolites . . . through whatever process” they chose to use.110 
Then, considering all the claim elements together, the Court concluded that 
the three steps in combination added “nothing to the laws of nature that is 
not already present when the steps are considered separately.”111 Finally, the 
Court observed that the steps in the claims beyond the laws of nature were 
routine steps that the scientific community already understood and 
employed.112 Put another way, there was nothing inventive in the steps. 
                                                                                                                         
See the Supreme Court discussion of district court conclusion on that issue in 
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1296. See 5B CHISUM, supra note 20, at § 18.04, 18-552–
60 (including an extended discussion of the doctrine of equivalents). 
105 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1297 (emphasis in original). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 1298.  
108 Id. at 1297. The administering step provided, “(a) administering a drug 
providing 6-thioguanine to a subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal 
disorder.” Id. at 1295. 
109 Id. at 1297. The first “wherein” step was if the level of the 6-thioguanine 
metabolite was below a certain level (indicating a need to increase the amount of 
the thiopurine drug), and the second “wherein” step was if the level of 6-
thioguanine was greater than a different specified level (indicating a need to 
decrease the amount of the thiopurine drug). Id. at 1295.  
110 Id. at 1297. The determining step provided, “(b) determining the level of 6-
thioguanine in said subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder.” 
Id. at 1295.  
111 Id. at 1298. The additional steps/limitations were “well-understood, routine, 
conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific community.” Id. In other 
words, the Court ultimately analyzed the steps in the aggregate. 
112 Id.  
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The Court then noted that consideration of Parker v. Flook, 
Diamond v. Diehr and Bilski v. Kappos reinforced its conclusion.113 In 
Flook, the Court rejected a method that used a formula to update alarm 
limits during a catalytic conversion process.114 In Prometheus, the Court 
noted that the claim elements in Flook beyond the formula “were all ‘well 
known,’ to the point where, putting the formula to the side, there was no 
‘inventive concept’ in the claimed application of the formula.”115 
Explaining the result in Flook, the Prometheus Court also said, “‘[P]ost-
solution activity’ that is purely ‘conventional or obvious’ . . . ‘can[not] 
transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable process.’”116  
In Diehr, the Court held that a patent for a method of molding raw, 
uncured rubber into a variety of cured molded products that included the use 
of the Arrhenius equation constituted patentable subject matter.117 The 
Prometheus Court explained that the steps in the Diehr patent “apparently 
added to the [Arrhenius] formula something that in terms of patent law's 
objectives had significance.”118 By referring to “no inventive concept” to 
explain Flook and “added … something…of…significance”  to explain 
Diehr, the Prometheus Court focused on adding something significant, 
inventive, to the law of nature to support patentable subject matter.119 
In Bilski, the Court held that a process for hedging risks relating to 
price changes constituted an abstract idea and was therefore unpatentable 
                                                      
113 Id. at 1298–300. The Court also discussed Benson v. Gottschalk as an example 
of overly broad claims and an 1841 English patent case, Neilson v. Hartford, 
upholding a patent for an improved furnace, “since [the patent] explained how the 
principle [use of hot air worked better than cold air in the furnace] could be 
implemented in an inventive way.” Id. at 1300–01. 
114 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
115 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1299. 
116 Id. (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 590).  
117 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177–78, 192 n.2; Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. 
at 1298; supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. 
118 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1299. 
119 Many scholars have suggested that the different results in Flook (not 
patentable subject matter) and Diehr (patentable subject matter) are difficult to 
reconcile. See, e.g., Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 82, 89 & n.38 (2012). As Professor Chao points out, the Court in 
Prometheus tried to distinguish Flook from Diehr by saying that the “other steps 
[in Diehr] apparently added to the formula something [without identifying the 
something] that in terms of patent law’s objective had significance.” Id. at 88; 
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192–93. The apparent tension between the two decisions may 
be a reflection that although patentable subject matter is a question of law, there 
can be underlying facts which affect the determination of the legal question. See 
In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
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subject matter.120 The Prometheus Court pointed out that Bilski confirmed 
that simple “field-of-use” limits did not turn an unpatentable idea into 
patentable subject matter. It explained, “The fact that some of the claims 
limited hedging to use in commodities and energy markets and specified 
that ‘well-known random analysis techniques [could be used] to help 
establish some of the inputs into the equation’ did not undermine th[e] 
conclusion” that it was unpatentable subject matter.121  In other words, the 
“inventor” must add something that was not well-known to turn 
unpatentable subject matter into a patentable application. 
In addition, the Prometheus Court cited a number of scholarly 
works on the risks of overly broad patent claims foreclosing more future 
innovation than the underlying discovery could justify.122 The Court did not 
adopt the arguments of these eminent scholars as the motivating principles 
for its holding in Prometheus, but instead agreed that these arguments 
“reinforces our conclusion that the processes described in the patents are not 
patent eligible, while eliminating any temptation to depart from case law 
precedent.”123 
3. Importance of “new” in § 101 and inventive concept for laws of nature 
In part III of Prometheus, the Court specifically addressed and 
rejected four of Prometheus’s arguments.124 First, it rejected the argument 
that the patent claim met the Bilski transformation test.125 Although the 
Court recognized that the machine or transformation test was a useful and 
important clue, it emphasized it had never said “the test trumps the ‘law of 
nature’ exclusion.”126 Second, the Court rejected Prometheus’s argument 
that the Federal Circuit’s decision should be affirmed because the particular 
law of nature reflected in the patent claim was narrow and specific.127 It 
                                                      
120 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3239 (2010). See also notes 79–86 and 
accompanying text.  
121 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1300–01. 
122 Id. at 1301–02 (citing Life After Bilski, supra note 14; CREATION, supra note 14, 
at 112; ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 14, at 305–306. 
123 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1302. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. For a detailed discussion of the machine-or-transformation test, see CHISUM 
TREATISE, supra note 20, at § 1.03[6][k], pp. 1-329-330.4. 
126 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1303 (emphasis in original) (referring to the 
“machine-or-transformation test” discussed in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225–27). 
127 Id. (“[O]ur cases have not distinguished among different laws of nature 
according to whether or not the principles they embody are sufficiently narrow . . . 
[T]he cases have endorsed a bright-line prohibition against patenting laws of nature, 
mathematical formulas and the like, which serves as a somewhat more easily 
administered proxy for the underlying ‘building-block’ concern.”). 
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declined to consider the argument (without examining the accuracy of the 
facts asserted) that denying patent eligibility would interfere significantly 
with medical research, particularly in diagnostics.128  
More significant is the Supreme Court’s response to the argument 
about the word “new” in 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the adoption by Congress of 
the “novelty” requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 102 in the 1952 Patent Act.129 
Some courts and scholars had argued that the adoption of the separate 
statutory novelty requirement essentially repealed by implication the word 
“new” in § 101, whereas others argued they were two separate 
requirements.130 
The Prometheus Court resolved the argument by holding that the 
two requirements—“new” in § 101 and “novelty” in § 102—were different 
                                                      
128 Id. at 1304–35. The Court noted, “[t]he American Medical Association, the 
American College of Medical Genetics, the American Hospital Association, the 
American Society of Human Genetics, the Association of American Medical 
Colleges, the Association for Molecular Pathology, and other medical organizations 
tell us that if ‘claims to exclusive rights over the body’s natural responses to illness 
and medical treatment are permitted to stand, the result will be a vast thicket of 
exclusive rights over the use of critical scientific data that must remain widely 
available if physicians are to provide sound medical care.’ . . . we must hesitate 
before departing from established general legal rules lest a new protective rule that 
seems to suit the needs of one field produce unforeseen results in another . . . We 
need not determine here whether, from a policy perspective, increased protection 
for discoveries of diagnostic laws of nature is desirable.” Id. 
129 See CHISUM TREATISE, supra note 20, at OV-12-13 (“Whether Congress 
intended to repudiate the Supreme Court’s stringent ‘invention’ decisions leading 
up to Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea[, 340 U.S. 147 (1950),] or merely to codify 
existing standards was a matter of dispute among the lower courts and 
commentators.”). As enacted by the Patent Act of 1952, § 102 only contained the 
word “novelty” in the title. That and three clauses in § 102—clauses (a), (e) and (g) 
before the effective date of the America Invents Act (“AIA“)—have been cited as 
the novelty requirement. See JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW (3rd ed. 2009), at 
139 [hereinafter MUELLER PATENT LAW]. The passage of the “AIA worked 
significant changes to U.S. patent law, including redefining what counts as prior art. 
The practical result . . . is that the U.S. patent system will operate under a dual 
regime ('pre-AIA' and 'post-AIA' rules) for 30 years or more after the AIA's 
enactment.” JANICE M. MUELLER, MUELLER ON PATENT LAW: PATENTABILITY AND 
VALIDITY (2012) [hereinafter MUELLER TREATISE), Chapter 7 explanatory note at 
7-5 through 7-6. None of the complexities about pre-AIA and post-AIA concerning 
novelty and § 102, however, can change the analysis of the word “new” in § 101, 
since the AIA did not amend § 101. 
130 Compare Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 602 
n.74 (2008) [hereinafter Everything is Patentable] with Demaine & Fellmeth, supra 
note 82, at 361, 364 (“[T]he requirement that an invention be ‘new’ requires that 
the product or process must not have previously existed in nature.”). 
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but overlapping. As amicus, the United States government had argued that 
“virtually any step beyond a statement of a law of nature itself should 
transform an unpatentable law of nature into a potentially patentable 
application sufficient to satisfy § 101’s demands” and that the novelty 
requirement of § 102, the non-obvious requirement of § 103, and the 
description requirements of § 112 could perform any necessary screening 
that remain.131 The Court rejected that argument as inconsistent with prior 
law and pointed out that such an “approach . . . would make the ‘law of 
nature’ exception to § 101 patentability a dead letter.”132  Although 
acknowledging that the § 101 and § 102 inquiries might at times—but 
would not always—overlap, the Court cautioned against shifting the patent-
eligibility inquiry to §§ 102 and 103 and risking “creating significantly 
greater legal uncertainty, while assuming that those sections can do work 
that they are not equipped to do.”133  
In her article cited by the Supreme Court in Prometheus in 
reference to work that § 102 is not equipped to do,134 Professor Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg identified the work for § 101: 
Each of the categories listed in [§ 102] . . . identifies a prior source of 
human knowledge with no mention of products or phenomena of 
nature that have not yet come to the attention of humans. . . . In other 
words, without assistance from the doctrine of patentable subject 
matter, newly discovered products and phenomena of nature do not 
seem to qualify as prior art under § 102 alone.135  
Professor Eisenberg concluded that the patentable subject matter 
requirements of § 101 provide “an additional tool for limiting the scope of 
patents that might otherwise unduly impede future research.”136 In 
particular, Professor Eisenberg noted that “[d]octrinal redundancy is a 
common feature of legal systems and may make sense if the interest at stake 
                                                      
131 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1303. The United States had argued that the patent 
application would “likely fail for lack of novelty under § 102.” See id. 
132 Id. (citations omitted). 
133 Id. at 1304. 
134 Id. 
135 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom Of The Ages Or Dead-Hand Control? Patentable 
Subject Matter For Diagnostic Methods After In Re Bilski, 3 CASE W. RESERVE 
J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 54–55 (2012). 
136 Id. at 64. See also Michael D. Davis, The Patenting Of Products Of Nature, 21 
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 293, 332–33 (1995) (“The novelty issue is 
essentially resolved . . . by determining whether the invention was known or used 
prior to its discovery by the patentee . . . . [I]n the Supreme Court’s view, the 
‘product of nature’ exclusion exists apart from any question of novelty in section 
102.”). 
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is important.”137 
The Court in Prometheus did not detail precise rules for 
determining what was “new” within the meaning of § 101, but instead set 
forth a broad standard—”inventive concept”138—as a guide for 
distinguishing unpatentable physical phenomena and laws of nature from 
potentially patentable applications of such phenomena and laws.139 This is 
an important step in clarifying that the building blocks of knowledge and 
principles behind them remain free from patent law for all to use.  
Furthermore, the Court did not slip in “inventive concept” as dicta 
in Prometheus. Immediately after citing Flook, Morse, and Gottschalk, the 
Court restated the principle from these cases: “they insist that a process that 
focuses upon the use of a natural law also contain other elements or a 
combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an inventive concept,’ 
sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more 
than a patent upon the natural law itself.”140 Similarly, the Supreme Court in 
Flook said: 
“Even though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula may 
be well known, an inventive application of the principle may be 
patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot 
support a patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its 
application.”141 
Therefore, the Court in both Prometheus and Flook tied the inventive 
concept requirement for patentable subject matter to situations in which the 
patent application focused on a law of nature or natural physical 
phenomenon. 
The Supreme Court even discussed an English patent case, Neilson 
v. Harford, to provide guidance on the meaning of “inventive concept.”142 
Although the patent in Neilson reflected the principle that “hot air promotes 
                                                      
137 Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 50. 
138 See Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. 
139 See John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards On The Forefront Of Patentability, 51 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 611, 623 (2009) (“Clear rules can provide the certainty 
that encourages investment both in obtaining and developing the rights, but 
standards can provide the flexibility to accommodate the hew and unpredictable 
wonders of human ingenuity . . . [T]he law defining limits of patentability has 
generally been hostile to rule-based approaches, and that hostility has been 
especially apparent for rules of exclusions at the Supreme Court.”). See also 
Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 14 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s preference for 
bright-line rules and the Supreme Court’s decisions typically stating broad open-
ended principles).  
140 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (citing Flook, 437 U.S. at 594). 
141 Flook, 437 U.S. at 594 (1978) (emphasis added). 
142 See Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1300. 
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ignition [in a furnace] better than cold air,” it also “included . . . several 
unconventional steps (such as inserting the receptacle, applying heat to the 
receptacle externally, and blowing the air into the furnace).”143 
The Prometheus Court therefore highlighted the Neilson patent as 
an example that “explained how the principle could be implemented in an 
inventive way,”144 or in other words, specific steps that had not been used 
before the principle had been discovered. 
E. The Standard—Protecting Basic Building Blocks 
Prometheus is not a recent aberration, but affirms principles 
recognized by over 150 years of Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Court 
has applied the principles in the case of product patents145 and process 
patents.146 Moreover, much leading scholarship regarding patent law, 
including biotechnology patents and articles cited by the Supreme Court in 
Prometheus, supports the Court’s application of these principles to DNA 
segments. 
Writing for a unanimous Court in Prometheus, Justice Breyer 
discussed in detail the importance of the boundaries for patent rights. He 
repeated twice the Court’s statement in Gottschalk that the basic tools of 
scientific and technological work were not patentable.147 He also referred to 
the concern about preemption, observing that “upholding the patents would 
risk disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying natural laws, 
inhibiting their use in the making of further discoveries.”148 Justice Breyer 
then explained that “the cases have endorsed a bright-line prohibition 
against patenting laws of nature, mathematical formulas and the like, which 
serves as a somewhat more easily administered proxy for the underlying 
'building-block' concern.”149 Justice Breyer said, “The exclusion from patent 
law of basic truths reflects . . . ‘the enormous transaction costs that would 
                                                      
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 See, e.g., Am. Fruit Growers, supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text; Funk 
Bros., supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text; Chakrabarty, supra notes 63–70 
and accompanying text. 
146 See Morse, supra note 39 and accompanying text (both product and process); 
Gottschalk, supra note 59 and accompanying text; Bilski, supra note 79. 
147 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1293, 1301 (emphasis added). 
148 Id. at 1294. 
149 Id. at 1303. Although the exclusions of laws of nature and physical phenomena 
are bright-line prohibitions, determining the dividing line between an unpatentable 
law of nature and a patentable application is in practice a standard. See supra Part 
I.D.1. 
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be imposed on would-be users’ of those truths.”150 Justice Breyer added that 
patents on such basic truths threatened to inhibit the future development of 
medical treatment recommendations.151 
Justice Breyer cited and quoted from a number of scholarly articles 
to support his concern about patenting basic research.152 For instance, 
Justice Breyer cited Professor Eisenberg’s article discussing the Court’s 
Bilski decision.153 In that article, Professor Eisenberg concluded that the 
language in Supreme Court decisions excluding “basic tools of scientific 
and technological research” hinted at a policy justification to “guide courts 
today in adapting patentable subject matter doctrine to inventions at the 
current forefronts of technology.”154  Justice Breyer also cited “Life After 
Bilski,”155 in which the authors argued that ideas and natural phenomena 
were free to all and reserved exclusively to none unless “the patent claims 
describe the application of human knowledge to a practical end, rather than 
merely identification of the existence of useful properties.”156 It is 
reasonable to conclude that the unanimous Court in Prometheus cited these 
articles to clarify the boundaries of patent law so courts would apply in the 
future this broad standard for exclusion from patent protection. These 
articles are also consistent with a series of other scholarly articles 
specifically addressing patentable subject matter in the case of 
biotechnology. 
In two seminal 2003 articles challenging the validity of isolated 
DNA patents, Professors John M. Conley and Roberte Makowski argued for 
a robust public domain in biotechnology.157 They declared, “If the product 
itself is substantially the same as its natural counterpart, it fails the statutory 
                                                      
150 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1302 (quoting ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 14, 
at 304–305). 
151 Id. at 1302. 
152 See id. at 1294, 1295, 1303 (“[U]pholding the patents would risk 
disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying natural laws, inhibiting their 
use in the making of further discoveries. . . . The patent claims at issue here set 
forth processes embodying researchers’ findings that identified these correlations 
with some precision . . . The patent claims seek to embody this research in a set of 
processes . . . . [E]ven a narrow law of nature (such as the one before us) can inhibit 
future research.“); ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 14, at 306.  
153 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1304 (citing Eisenberg, supra note 135). 
154 Eisenberg, supra note 131, at 8, 64.  
155 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1302 (citing Life After Bilski, supra note 14). See also 
Everything is Patentable, supra note 130, for an earlier argument from one of the 
law journal article’s authors, Michael Risch, that everything is patentable subject 
matter. 
156 Id. at 1329. 
157 See Conley & Makowski, supra note 54, at 306.  
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subject matter test, regardless of how it is produced.”158 They rejected the 
idea that claims using “isolated,” “purified,” or “synthesized” should 
reflexively receive a patent. Instead, after reviewing “more than a hundred 
years of precedent,”159 they concluded that “[w]here a claimed invention has 
a natural counterpart, it must be shown to differ from that counterpart in 
substance, not merely in degree.”160 
In 2004 and 2011, Professor Kane analyzed the patentability of a 
gene as both a “static chemical compound” and a “dynamic template 
executed through the genetic code.”161 Professor Kane suggested that “DNA 
gene sequences . . . actually embody a law of nature, as each sequence will 
govern (and dictate) the execution of a fixed relationship between DNA and 
protein.”162 She concluded that, gene patenting therefore “results in the 
constructive preemption of the genetic code.”163 In her 2011 article, she 
analyzed the basis for the laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas exclusion, and observed that “[t]he underlying rationale for the 
exclusions is that scientific advances depend on an available substrate of 
basic knowledge and that, therefore, patenting the intellectual foundations 
of a field has an adverse effect on its progress.”164 
In a 2011 article, Allen Yu noted the limits that the Constitution 
imposed on patent rights covering basic tools of scientific and technological 
work.165 He argued, “[T]he Court should redefine its vague and relatively 
weak judicial prohibition against the patenting of nature and abstract ideas 
in terms of a stronger, more explicit prohibition against the patenting of 
‘basic tools of scientific and technological work.’”166 He continued that any 
knowledge constituting a basic tool of scientific and technological work—
the patenting of which will more likely impede than promote the progress of 
innovation—should be deemed ineligible for patenting.”167 
                                                      
158 Conley & Makowski, supra note 71, at 392.  
159 Id. at 397. 
160 Id. 
161 Eileen M. Kane, Splitting The Gene: DNA Patents And The Genetic Code, 71 
TENN. L. REV. 707, 712 (2004); Kane, supra note 26. 
162 Béné v. Jeantet, 129 U.S. 683, 686 (1889) (emphasis added). 
163 Kane, supra note 161, at 753. See also id. at 741, 742 (noting, “the strict 
compositional analysis . . . does not adequately account for the value of a DNA 
gene sequence claim . . . [because] the genetic information survives chemical 
reformatting from DNA to mRNA to cDNA“). 
164 Kane, supra note 26, at 2. 
165 Yu, supra note 15, at 428–30. 
166 Id. at 428. 
167 Id. at 428–29. See id. at 430 (acknowledging that the question of what 
constituted a basic tool would not necessarily lead to an easier resolution and 
arguing, “The main advantage of this requirement is that instead of focusing on 
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In short, certain “building blocks” of nature are free from patent 
enclosure; they are free for all to use.168 As a standard, however, it remains 
too vague to guide lower courts. Something more is necessary. Supreme 
Court cases have implemented the standard through the “proxy” of 
determining whether the patents at issue improperly claim laws of nature or 
                                                                                                                         
legally constructed notions of what is nature and what is man-made, this 
requirement focuses on articulating the costs of patents.”). Many scholars have 
emphasized limiting the scope of patents as an important tool. See, e.g., Robert P. 
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On The Complex Economics Of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 913 (1990) (“[I]t is basic to the grant of a patent that the 
scope of a patent should not exceed the scope of invention . . . the purposes of the 
patent law will be adequately served if patents on compounds which are structurally 
obvious from the prior art are limited to method (i.e. process) patents directed to the 
new and useful characteristic or property which is the essence of the discovery or 
invention.”); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW 
THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 104 (2009) (“[A]s a general principle, a flexible 
common-law approach of ongoing judicial oversight will best accommodate new 
and different technologies within the general framework of a patent statute.”); 
Robin Feldman, Whose Body Is It Anyway? Human Cells And The Strange Effects 
Of Property And Intellectual Property Law, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1377, 1398–400 
(2011) (“By allowing a patent on DNA segments in laboratory form, even if those 
segments are entirely artificial, are we indirectly allowing the patent holder to tie up 
the natural phenomenon of the gene itself in the human body? . . . The solution lies 
in properly limiting the scope of the allowed claim. In a case like Molecular 
Pathology, this limitation could be accomplished through the disclosure 
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 102.”); Burton T. Ong, Patenting The Biological 
Bounty Of Nature: e-Examining The Statutes Of Organic Inventions As Patentable 
Subject Matter, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 8 (2004) (advancing “the 
proposition that only process patents should be made available in respect to organic 
inventions because they better reflect what the scientist deserves for his or her 
inventive efforts and are better measurements of his or her contribution to the pre-
existing ‘biotechnology’ of nature”). 
168 See Emir Aly Crowne Mohammed, What Is An Invention? A Review Of The 
Literature On Patentable Subject Matter, 15 RICH. J.L.TECH. 2, 30 (2008) (“If we 
accept this line of argument, then any scientific breakthrough that peels back 
another layer of ‘fundamentality’ (which is what science does) will reveal that the 
existing layer was not truly fundamental after all and that awarding patents for that 
previously fundamental layer is now acceptable, ad infinitum.”). It is true that 
science has advanced dramatically, but it does not follow that awarding patents for 
unapplied scientific principles discovered in any particular year is acceptable, 
because ultimately we will we know much more behind the scientific principle 
discovered that year, so therefore what we once thought was fundamental is no 
longer fundamental. In other words, the issue is not whether the natural law is 
fundamental or not, but whether humans have added enough to the principle to take 
the claim from a natural law to a specific application of that law with inventive 
elements beyond the natural law. See supra Part I.D.3. 
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physical phenomena without adding an inventive concept.169  That proxy is 
actually implicit in some of the often overlooked words in § 101. 
II. CONSISTENCY BETWEEN “INVENT,” “NEW,” AND “USEFUL” IN § 
101 AND THE EXCLUSION OF LAWS OF NATURE AND PHYSICAL 
PHENOMENA 
A. Introduction 
The words “invent,” “new,” and “useful,” or some iteration of 
those words, have remained in the U.S. patent statute governing patentable 
subject matter since 1790.170 Scholars and lower courts have tended to focus 
on the four patent eligible categories in § 101 (processes, machines, 
compositions of matter and manufactures) and to disregard “new” while 
treating utility as a separate requirement.171 That may be because 
“invention” and “inventors” are mentioned in a number of other sections of 
the patent law,172 and § 102 addresses the question of novelty, which at least 
on first glance seems similar to “new.”173  
However, courts must consider the meaning of all the words in a 
statute, and generally it is improper for a court to ignore certain words when 
applying a statute.174 Although a “‘word may have a character of its own’ 
. . . the words associated with it may indicate that the true meaning of the 
                                                      
169 Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1289, 1303 (2012). 
170 See supra note 36, and accompanying text. 
171 See MOY, supra note 20, at § 5:1 (“The authorities refer to the two criteria 
included in section 101 as the requirements of ‘utility’ and ‘statutory subject 
matter,’ respectively,” with “statutory subject matter” referring to processes, 
machines, articles of manufacture and compositions of matter). For a similar 
discussion with a focus on four statutory categories, processes, machines, 
compositions of matter and manufactures, see MUELLER TREATISE, supra note 129, 
at §§ 3.01–3.06. 
172 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); see also Part I.B, infra. 
173 See MOY, supra note 20, at § 5:1 n.3 (arguing that “it has occasionally been 
asserted that the reference in section 101 to inventions that are ‘new’ provides the 
basis for an inquiry into the state of the art . . . The large weight of authority, 
however, holds that the criterion of adequate differences over the art is set out in 
sections 102 and 103.). But see infra Part I.D.3 (discussing the significance of the 
Prometheus Court’s discussion of “new” in § 101). 
174 See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172–74 (2001) (“We begin, as 
always, with the language of the statute . . . It is our duty give effect, if possible, to 
every clause and word of a statute.“); Krishnakumar, supra note 104, at 236. 
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series is to convey a common idea.”175 As a result, courts must consider the 
“other” words in § 101.176   
B. Invent 
Section 101 requires a patent applicant to have invented what she 
claims.177 As the Supreme Court said in Agawam Woolen Co. v. Jordan, 
“No one is entitled to a patent for that which he did not invent.”178 In 
Thompson v. Boisselier, the Court said that in order to receive a patent, the 
claimant “must be an inventor and he must have made a discovery.”179 In a 
                                                      
175 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
860, 861 (1984). 
176 See Menell, supra note 37, at 1314 (arguing that patentable subject matter 
cannot evolve to meet the new challenges of the information age without 
integrating eighteenth-, nineteenth-, and twentieth-century sources of patentable 
subject matter law into a flexible and evolving body of common law that is 
sensitive to history, statutory evolution, constitutional constraints, and an 
understanding of modern science and technology). 
177 See MUELLER TREATISE, supra note 129, at § 8.01 (“The patented invention 
must originate with the inventor. An inventor cannot merely learn from another’s 
invention and thereafter claim it as his own when seeking a patent.”). In addition to 
whether a person actually originated the claimed subject matter, courts have 
frequently referred to “invention” or “inventive” to refer to a qualitative measure of 
the difference between prior art and the claimed invention. In that context, courts 
rejected patents not showing a sufficiently “inventive” leap over prior art. See, e.g., 
Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 41 (1875) (“[T]he application by the patentee of an old 
process to a new subject, without any exercise of the inventive faculty, and without 
the development of any idea which can be deemed new or original in the sense of 
the patent law.”). The Patent Act of 1952 enacted 35 U.S.C. § 103, which required 
that a patent not issue for any claim for which the differences from prior art were 
obvious, effectively articulating what had been the court-imposed requirement of 
“inventive” differences. See Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 225–26 (1976) (“As a 
judicial test, ‘invention’, i.e., ‘an exercise of the inventive faculty,’ . . . has long 
been regarded as an absolute prerequisite to patentability . . . However, it was only 
in 1952 that Congress, in the interest of ‘uniformity and definiteness,’ articulated 
the requirement in a statute, framing it as a requirement of ‘nonobviousness.’”). 
Professor John F. Duffy concluded that § 103 “was designed to end the Court’s 
search for a distinction between ordinary and extraordinary ingenuity and to focus 
the inquiry solely on obviousness.” John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case 
Study Of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 43 (2007). In Prometheus the 
Supreme Court relied on the historical court-imposed “inventive” requirement 
when the subject matter focused on a law of nature to assist in determining whether 
enough had been added to the law of nature to transform the claim into patentable 
subject matter under § 101. See infra Part II.D. 
178 74 U.S. 583, 602 (1868). 
179 See Thompson v. Boisselier 114 U.S. 1, 11 (1885) (involving a patent for 
improvements in water closets). 
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general sense, “discover” can be broader than “invent.”180 As the D.C. 
Circuit held in In Re Kemper, “[i]nvention is applied to the contrivance and 
production of something that did not before exist. Discovery brings to light 
that which existed before, but which was not known.’ A discovery, in this 
sense, is not the subject of a patent . . . .”181 Thus, Kemper indicates that the 
use of “discover” in the context of patentable subject matter referred to a 
narrower definition of discovery synonymous with invention.182 
Other federal cases in the Nineteenth Century repeated the principle 
that in order to obtain a patent, the claimant must go beyond a discovery in 
the general sense of the word. For instance, Morton v. New York Eye 
Infirmary involved a patent for the use of ether during surgery on 
animals.183  The court said that a discovery was not patentable and that to be 
patentable the discovery had to be “connected …   with some particular 
medium or mechanical contrivance by which … it acts on the material 
world.”184 
Similarly, in Wall v. Leck, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
addressed a process for fumigating trees and plants substantially in the 
absence of sunlight.185 The court noted that the claimant had only 
discovered that the old process of fumigation was effective if performed at 
night and had not invented a machine, apparatus device, or process to 
exclude sunlight.186 The court held that such discovery was not a patentable 
invention and that “[a] mere naked principle, a law of nature, or property of 
matter cannot be patented.”187  In short, to be an inventor, a person needs to 
have passed beyond discovery in the broadest sense.  
                                                      
180 See Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 82, at 370 (“An ‘invention,’ in the parlance 
of the Constitution and early patent laws, is a new creation consciously sought and 
successfully reduced to practice by the inventor. A ‘discovery,’ as used in the same 
parlance, was intended to denote a fortuitous creation of the inventor and not 
merely something found by him or her.”). See also Yu, supra note 15, at 431–33; 
Sarnoff, supra note 15, at 64–66. 
181 In re Kemper, 14 F. Cas. 286, 287 (D.C. Cir., 1841).  
182 Id. at 287 (“[I]t will be found, by a careful perusal of the constitution and laws of 
the United States upon the subject of patents for useful arts . . . that it is not there 
used in this [general] sense, but always as synonymous with invention.”). 35 U.S.C. 
§ 100(a) provides, “The term ‘invention’ means invention or discovery.” 
183 See Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 881 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) 
(involving a patent for the use of ether in surgery on animals).  
184 See id. at 883 (rejecting the patent claim, as “the specification presents nothing 
new except the effect produced by well-known agents, administered in well-known 
ways on well-known subjects. This new or additional effect is not produced by any 
new instrument . . . .”). 
185 Wall v. Leck, 66 F. 552, 553 (9th Cir. 1895). 
186 Id. at 555. 
187 Id.  
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Patent disclosure law has reflected the requirement of invention 
since the first patent statute.188 In Evans v. Evans, the Supreme Court said 
one purpose of the statutory disclosure requirement (the specification) was 
to enable the public to understand what the applicant “claims as his own 
invention” and could determine if that invention was already in use.189 In 
Bene v. Jeantet, the Court held that a patent cannot extend the patentee’s 
rights beyond what was her “real invention.”190 In General Electric Co. v. 
Wabash Appliance Corp., the Court likewise held that an applicant must 
provide “‘a distinct and specific statement of what he claims to be new, and 
to be his invention.’”191 
The disclosure statute still reflects the invention requirement in the 
first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.192 That paragraph has three different 
requirements: (1) enablement,193 (2) best mode,194 and (3) written 
                                                      
188 Section 2 of the 1790 Patent Act provided in part that the applicant(s) “shall . . . 
deliver . . . a specification in writing, containing a description . . . of the things or 
things, by him or them invented or discovered . . . to enable a workman . . . to 
make, construct, or use the same . . . .” 9 CHISUM TREATISE, supra note 20, at 
Appendix 9, 9-2. Section 3 of the Patent Act of 1793 provided that every inventor 
“shall deliver a written description of his invention, and of the manner of using, or 
process of compounding the same . . . .” Id. at Appendix 10, 10-2. Section 6 of the 
Patent Act of 1836 provided, “before any inventor shall receive a patent for any 
such new invention or discovery, he shall deliver a written description of his 
invention or discovery, and of the manner of and process of making, constructing 
using, and compounding the same . . . .” Id. at Appendix 11, 11-3. Section 26 of the 
Patent Act of 1870 provided, “before any inventor or discover shall receive a patent 
for his invention or discovery, he shall . . . file . . . a written description of the same, 
and of the manner of and process of making, constructing using it . . . .” Id. at 
Appendix 14, 14-6.  
189 Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 434 (1822) (emphasis added). 
190 Béné v. Jeantet, 129 U.S. 683, 686 (1889) (emphasis added).  
191 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938). 
192 The complete text of paragraph (a) of § 112 (and the first paragraph of § 112 
prior to the America Invents Act) is: “The specification shall contain a written 
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, 
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art 
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the 
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out 
the invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
193 MUELLER TREATISE, supra note 129, at ch. 4; MOY, supra note 20, at §§ 7:2–26.  
194 MUELLER TREATISE, supra note 129, at ch. 5; MOY, supra note 20, at §§ 7:44–
57. As a result of the passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-29 (2011), the failure to comply with the best mode requirement of § 112 is no 
longer a basis for challenging the validity of a patent or as part of a post-grant 
review proceeding. See 35 U.S.C. § 282; 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (2012). 
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description.195 The purpose of the written description requirement of 
§ 112(a) is to show that the patent applicant in fact possesses the invention 
that she claims.196 Although historically the Federal Circuit considered the 
written description requirement in connection with disputes over which 
applicant for a patent had priority, the Federal Circuit held in Ariad Pharm., 
Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co.,197 that the written description requirement applied 
to all claims to require possession of the invention.198 The Federal Circuit 
reasoned “a generic claim may define the boundaries of a vast genus of 
chemical compounds, and yet the question may still remain whether the 
specification . . . demonstrates that the applicant has invented species 
sufficient to support a claim to a genus.”199 
Of course, humans have not invented laws of nature or physical 
phenomena.200 Judge Bryson emphasized this point in his dissent in Myriad 
                                                      
195 MUELLER TREATISE, supra note 129, at ch. 6; MOY, supra note 20, at §§ 7:27-
43. Professor Landers identifies four disclosure requirements in the first two 
paragraphs of § 112: written description, enablement, best mode and definiteness. 
AMY L. LANDERS, UNDERSTANDING PATENT LAW, § 7.01 (1st. ed. 2008). 
196 See Ariad Pharm, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (2010) (agreeing 
with Lilly's argument that requires that “the specification objectively demonstrate 
that the applicant actually invented—was in possession of—the claimed subject 
matter”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 
(1997) (“To fulfill the written description requirement, a patent specification must 
describe an invention and do so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can 
clearly conclude that ‘the inventor invented the claimed invention.’”); Vas-Cath 
Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The purpose of the 
‘written description’ requirement is broader than to merely explain how to ‘make 
and use’ . . . the proper test is whether the drawings conveyed with reasonable 
clarity to those of ordinary skill that Mahurkar had in fact invented the catheter 
recited in those claims.“).  
197 Ariad Pharm., 598 F.3d at 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
198 Id. at 1349, 1351. 
199 Id. at 1349. 
200 See, e.g., Michael D. Davis, The Patenting Of Products Of Nature, 21 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 293, 314 (1995) (“The basic building blocks necessary for 
life have remained unchanged throughout evolution.”). Whether God or chance 
resulted in the genetic code is irrelevant for purposes of determining invention, 
since at least humans did not invent the genetic code. Perhaps Judge Moore, in her 
concurring opinion in Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 689 
F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), was implicitly recognizing that underlying question 
when she said, “[t]he patents in question raise substantial moral and ethical issues 
related to awarding a property right to isolated portions of human DNA—the very 
thing that makes us humans, and not chimpanzees.” Id. at 1346 (Moore, J., 
concurring in part). In that connection, it is interesting that the two scientists who 
won the Nobel Prize for their monoclonal antibody technology determined it would 
be ethically inappropriate for them to patent their technique. See Rai, supra note 33, 
at 94. 
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Genetics: “the question in this case is whether an individual can obtain 
patent rights to a human gene. From a common-sense point of view, most 
observers would answer, ‘Of course not. Patents are for inventions. A 
human gene is not an invention.’”201  In other words, humans have not 
invented phenomena of nature or laws of nature; they have existed for 
centuries. Therefore, the § 101 requirement that the applicant shall have 
invented the claimed subject matter is consistent with the prohibition 
against patenting of laws of nature and physical phenomena. 
C. New 
The requirement that a patent claim be “new” is also consistent with 
excluding laws of nature, physical phenomena and the related limitation 
noted by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas 
City202: “Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects 
are . . . to restrict free access to materials already available.”203  Laws of 
nature and physical phenomena such as gravity and the genetic code are not 
new. They have been available  for discovery by humans and do not satisfy 
the § 101 requirement of being new.204 
The Supreme Court confirmed in Prometheus that there are two 
separate, but sometimes overlapping, comparisons of patent applications 
focusing on laws of nature or physical phenomena. The first is a two-part 
inquiry under § 101:  
a. Do the claims simply reflect a law of nature or 
physical phenomenon?  If so, the claims do not present 
something that is new, and therefore the subject matter 
of the claims does not constitute a patentable subject 
                                                      
201 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1348. (Bryson, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
202 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
203 Id. at 6. See also Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 82, at 386 (pointing out that 
products and processes that have existed in nature are not new). 
204 See, e.g., DeFranco, supra note 104, at 27 (“Laws of nature and natural 
phenomenon are not new.”). At least before the decision in Mayo Collaborative 
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012), there was a dispute about 
the basis for the three exclusions (laws of nature, physical phenomena and abstract 
ideas), but recognition that these exclusions were consistent with the text of § 101. 
In Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court held that “while these exceptions are not 
required by the statutory text, they are consistent with the notion that a patentable 
process must be ‘new and useful.’” Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). 
Professor Duffy concluded, “In sum, the traditional doctrines of patentable subject 
matter—the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas, natural phenomena and 
principles of nature—have survived because they have textual bases in the statute 
and because they have been amorphous.” Duffy, supra note 139, at 646. 
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matter within the meaning of § 101;205 and 
b. If the claims reflect more than a law of nature or 
physical phenomenon, do the patent claims add 
enough (an inventive concept) to the natural 
correlations to allow the processes or products they 
describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that 
apply natural laws?206 !
The above inquiry on whether or not an applicant has added enough 
represents a flexible standards-based inquiry consistent with guidance from 
more than two hundred years of common law.207   
Therefore, “new” applies to § 101 and “novelty” applies to §§ 102 
and 103. Justice Breyer said in Prometheus that “§§  102 and 103 say 
nothing about treating laws of nature as if they were part of the prior art 
when applying those sections.”208 Prior art in §§ 102 and 103 only covers 
knowledge disclosed by humans, so undiscovered laws of nature cannot 
constitute prior art.209 A court thus should not consider laws of nature as 
prior art for purposes of §§ 102 and 103, because “all inventions can be 
reduced to underlying principles of nature, which, once known, make their 
implementation obvious.”210 The placements of “new” with § 101 and 
“novelty” to §§ 102 and 103 reflect the holding in Diehr that the novelty of 
an element in a process, or the whole process, “is of no relevance in 
determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 
categories.”211   
The decision in Prometheus should end the controversy that had 
existed over “new” in § 101.212 “New” remains a requirement in § 101 and 
is not “preempted” by the novelty requirement in § 103.213 
                                                      
205 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1293, 1296. 
206 Id. at 1294, 1298. 
207 See supra notes 132–133 and accompanying text (standards vs. rules); supra 
notes 37, 176 (on the common law nature of § 101). Professor Duffy has suggested 
that “the prohibition against patenting principles of nature still survives . . . because 
it has been applied more like a standard than a rule.” Duffy, supra note 139, at 644.  
208 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1304 (2012). Although § 103 does not identify what 
constitutes “prior art,” the reference to § 102 indicates the sources to consider for 
novelty in § 102 are the same sources to consider for prior art in § 103. CHISUM, 
supra note 20, at § 5.03[3], pp. 5-146 to -7. 
209 Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 53–55. 
210 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1304 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189–
90 n.12). 
211 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 189. See also Eisenberg, supra note 135, at 54. 
212 See supra Part I.C.3. 
471 AFTER PROMETHEUS [Vol. 11 
 
D. Useful 
Another consistent requirement of the U.S. patent statutes on 
patentable subject matter has been that an invention be “useful,” an 
undefined term.214 Professor Landes and Judge Posner have identified two 
economic purposes for the utility requirement. “One is to rule out patents on 
basic research, and another is to delay the point in the development of a new 
product or process at which a patent may be obtained.”215   
Historically, the courts have set a low standard for what qualifies as 
“useful.”216 For instance in a case involving the sale of a beverage dispenser 
designed to mislead customers, the court concluded the beverage dispenser 
was useful to the seller. The court reasoned that “[t]he fact that customers 
may believe they are receiving fluid directly from the display tank does not 
deprive the invention of utility[,] . . . even if the use of a reservoir 
containing fluid that is not dispensed is considered deceptive.”217 
 Since 1966, however, the courts have applied a more stringent 
utility requirement in the case of certain chemical and biotech claims.218 In 
                                                                                                                         
213 See Liivak, supra note 23, at 264 (“[M]ost claims to purified and isolated gene 
sequences are invalid because such patent claims cannot meet the requirements of 
the patent act when the patent act is properly interpreted to include a requirement of 
originality.”). 
214 CHISUM, supra notes 20; see MUELLER TREATISE, supra note 129, at 6A, p. 235 
(“[T]he statute does not define what useful (or utility) means.“); supra note 36. 
Scholars often reasonably analyze the patentable subject matter separately from the 
requirement that an invention be useful, while recognizing that “useful” is part of 
§ 101. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (6th ed. 2012) 
(analyzing “Patentable Subject Matter” in Chapter 3B1 and “Utility” in Chapter 
3B2); CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS (2d ed. 2011) (analyzing 
“Eligible Subject Matter” in Chapter 3A and “Utility” in Chapter 3B). 
215 ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 14, at 302. The third purpose they identify is 
“to reduce the cost of patent searches by screening out useless inventions by cranks 
or amateurs . . . .” Id. 
216 See MOY, supra note 20, at vol. 2, § 6:1 (“By long-standing judicial 
interpretation, an invention is generally considered to possess utility if it is 
minimally useful for its intended purpose . . . The statutory requirement therefore 
forms only a low barrier to patentability in most cases.”). See also MUELLER, supra 
note 129, at § 10.01. 
217 Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
See also MUELLER, supra note 129, at 6B, p. 236 (“Utility is rarely an issue for 
mechanical or electrical inventions; even novelty items, games, or toys that might 
be considered trivial or frivolous can satisfy the utility requirement.”). 
218 See MOY, supra note 20, at vol. 2, § 6:1 (“[T]here may be emerging a more 
stringent test for adequate utility with regard to chemical products and other 
inventions that have wide potential uses.”); MUELLER TREATISE, supra note 129, at 
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Brenner v. Manson,219 a case involving a process for making a steroid 
whose use was not known without further research, the Supreme Court held 
that the patent failed to meet the requirement of usefulness.220  The Court 
noted that a product, or a process for making a product, was not useful 
simply because the product was “an object of use-testing,”221 and warned 
that a “patent is not a hunting license . . . [or] a reward for the search, but 
compensation for its successful conclusion.”222  
In a 2005 biotech case, In re Fisher,223 the Federal Circuit ruled that 
a claim for expressed sequence tags lacked utility, because the only use for 
expressed sequence tags was to identify nucleic acid sequences.224 The court 
ruled that “an application must show that an invention is useful to the public 
as disclosed in its current form, not that it may prove useful at some future 
date after further research.”225   
Before the decision in Fisher, Professors Eisenberg and Merges 
argued that “one plausible reading of [Brenner] . . . is that the utility 
requirement serves a timing function, leaving basic research discoveries in 
the public domain until they have yielded tangible benefits and have thereby 
left ‘the realm of philosophy’ and entered ‘the world of commerce.’”226 In 
addition, Professor Risch observed that the practical use requirement 
                                                                                                                         
§ 10.01 (“The utility disputes that do arise tend to involve inventions in the 
chemical and biotechnical arts.”). 
219 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966). 
220 Id. at 535. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 536. In 1999 Professor Rai suggested, “[I]nventions that were primarily 
useful tools for future researchers . . . would not offer the specific commercial 
utility required by the Supreme Court in [Brenner].” Rai, supra note 33, at 138. 
Because of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Fisher, which is discussed next and 
which strictly interpreted Brenner, this suggestion about the effect of the utility 
requirement would still be applicable today. 
223 In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
224 Id. at 1370. The Federal Circuit explained, “An EST is a short nucleotide 
sequence that represents a fragment of a cDNA clone. It is typically generated by 
isolating a cDNA clone and sequencing a small number of nucleotides located at 
the end of one of the two cDNA strands. When an EST is introduced into a sample 
containing a mixture of DNA, the EST may hybridize with a portion of DNA. Such 
binding shows that the gene corresponding to the EST was being expressed at the 
time of mRNA extraction.” Id. at 1367. 
225 Id. at 1371. 
226 Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter As To The 
Patentability Of Certain Inventions Associated With The Identification of Partial 
cDNA Sequences, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 6 (1996). After analyzing in depth the issue of 
patentability of the EST’s in question, they correctly concluded, “Although the 
matter is not entirely free from doubt, we believe that it is more likely than not that 
the Federal Circuit would hold all of the claims invalid for lack of utility.” Id. at 51. 
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“reveals a fundamental normative foundation of the patent system: basic 
science, no matter how important and valuable, does not merit protection 
and is therefore not useful in the patent sense.”227   
As with the statutory requirements of “invents” and “new,” the 
application of the statutory requirement of “useful” to biotech claims is 
consistent with the exclusion from patentable subject matter of laws of 
nature and physical phenomena.228 In light of the consistency between the 
text of § 101, there was no reason for the Federal Circuit not to apply such 
exclusions to the claims in Myriad Genetics, discussed next.229 
III. APPLICATION OF THE ABOVE PRINCIPLES TO THE ISOLATED 
DNA AND CDNA CLAIMS IN MYRIAD GENETICS 
A. The Three Often-Conflicting Opinions in Myriad Genetics 
The Federal Circuit’s 2012 decision in Myriad Genetics consists of 
three separate opinions.230 Writing as the “majority opinion,”231 Judge 
                                                      
227 Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1195, 1220 (2010). 
228 In analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in Bilski prior to its decision in 
Prometheus, Donald S. Chisum argued that “[o]ne way to look at the words ‘new 
and useful’ in Section 101, together with the words ‘invents’ or ‘discovers,’ is that 
they limit the four categories to what the Article I patent power calls the ‘useful 
Arts,’ which in turn has been translated into modern language as ‘technology.’” 
Donald S. Chisum, Weeds and Seeds In the Supreme Court’s Business Method 
Patents Decision: New Directions for Regulating Patent Scope, 15 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 11, 33, 34 (2011). 
229 This article does not suggest there is a way to turn “building blocks” into an all-
encompassing theory of patentable subject matter grounded in the Constitution. 
Among other things, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III said (albeit in a different 
context), “cosmic constitutional theories can falsely suggest simple answers to 
intractable problems . . . . The theories supply ingredients of appropriate 
constitutional interpretation, but only ingredients. To see them as answers is to 
succumb to the notion that a document as complex as the Constitution can 
somehow be bottled and pasteurized.” JUDGE J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE 
RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 6 (2012). However, using “basic building blocks” 
seems to be a good starting standard. 
230 The initial Federal Circuit decision in Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), also had three opinions by the same 
judges that were extremely similar to the later decision in Myriad Genetics, 689 
F.3d 1303 (2012).  
231 In dissent, Judge Bryson noted, “[a]lthough I recognize that Judge Lourie and 
Judge Moore, while reaching the same ultimate conclusions, have taken analytical 
paths that differ in some respects, for convenience I will refer to Judge Lourie’s 
opinion as the majority opinion and Judge Moore’s opinion as the concurring 
opinion.” Myriad, 689 F.3d at 1350 n.2 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and 
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Lourie concluded that all product/composition claims at issue constituted 
patentable subject matter, because he believed all the isolated DNA 
segments were substantially different from the DNA found in humans and 
were  “man-made.”232 Judge Moore was not convinced that the longer 
strands of isolated DNA in claim 1233 functioned differently than the native 
DNA,234 but she agreed that the smaller, isolated DNA segments did have 
markedly different characteristics and functions than those of native 
DNA.235  However, Judge Moore likewise upheld all product/composition 
claims, largely in deference to the practice of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office [USPTO] in granting patents on similar claims for 
years.236 
Judge Bryson ended up dissenting “from the court’s holding that 
Myriad’s BRCA gene claims and its claims to gene fragments [were] 
patent-eligible” and argued that the isolated DNA segments of claim 1 were 
not substantially different in characteristics and utility than those of the 
DNA found in nature.237 Judge Bryson, however, agreed with Judges Lourie 
                                                                                                                         
dissenting in part). 
232 Id. at 1308–33 (referring to “man-made” at 1325). This article focuses on what 
Judge Lourie determined were representative composition claims 1 and 2 of the 
’282 patent since each of the three opinions discussed whether these claims 
constituted patentable subject matter. Id. at 309. For identification of each of the 
claims involved, see Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1309. Judge Lourie concluded 
his opinion on the composition claims by stating “the issue before us patent 
eligibility, not patentability, about which we express no opinion.” Id. at 1333. The 
method claims decided in Myriad Genetics are beyond the scope of this article. 
233 The representative product claims of the ’282 patent are:  
1. An isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said polypeptide 
having the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:2 [“Claim 1”].  
2. The isolated DNA of claim 1, wherein said DNA has the nucleotide 
sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:1. [“Claim 2”].  
5. An isolated DNA having at least 15 nucleotides of the DNA of claim 1. 
[“Claim 5”]. 
Id. at 1309. 
234 Id. at 1343. Judge Lourie felt the functioning of the DNA segments was 
irrelevant in determining patentable subject matter. See infra notes 252–260 and 
accompanying text. 
235 Id. at 1342.  
236 Id. at 1343–48. Judge Moore also referred to deference to the expectations of an 
un-named investment community and to Congress. See infra notes 280–299 and 
accompanying text. 
237 Id. at 1348, 1354–55 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“[T]he test employed by the Supreme Court in Chakrabarty requires us to focus on 
two things: (1) the similarity in structure between what is claimed and what is 
found in nature and (2) the similarity in utility between what is claimed and what is 
found in nature.“). Judge Bryson argued that claims 5 and 6 to short DNA and 
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and Moore that the claims for isolated cDNA segments (e.g., claim 2) were 
patentable subject matter.238 
1. Application of Prometheus to Product Patents 
Judge Lourie discounted Prometheus because it involved process 
claims. Writing for the court, Judge Lourie explained that, “[w]hile 
[Prometheus] and earlier decisions concerning method claim patentability 
provide valuable insights and illuminate broad, foundational principles, the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers set out the 
primary framework for deciding the patent eligibility of compositions of 
matter, including isolated DNA molecules.”239  
Judge Moore, by contrast, acknowledged that even though 
Prometheus involved process claims, the application of the laws of nature 
exception in Prometheus also applied to product claims such as those in 
Myriad Genetics.240  In Judge Moore’s opinion, “Myriad’s argument that 
Prometheus is constrained to methods is an untenable position.”241 Judge 
Bryson agreed with Judge Moore that Prometheus was not limited to 
process patents. Citing Prometheus, Judge Bryson reasoned that “a patent 
involving a product of nature should have an inventive concept that 
involves more than merely incidental changes to the naturally occurring 
product.”242 
2. Preemptive effect of claims 
Judge Lourie rejected the concern over preemption the Supreme 
                                                                                                                         
cDNA segments were invalid due to overbreadth. Id. at 1356 (arguing that “[t]he 
problem with claim 6 is that it is so broad that it includes products of nature (the 
BRCA1 exons) and portions of other genes; its validity is not salvaged because it 
includes some species that are not natural [the cDNA segments]. Accordingly, I 
would hold claim 6 unpatentable.”). With respect to claim 5, he said, “The other 
claim to a short segment of DNA, claim 5 of the ’282 patent, is breathtakingly 
broad . . . Claim 5 would therefore be unpatentable for the same reasons as claim 1 
and claim 6.” Id. at 1356–57. This article does not address claims 5 or 6, since all 
three opinions on whether claims 1 and 2 address more clearly the views of the 
judges on patentable subject matter, and since the Supreme Court has only granted 
certiorari on whether human genes are patentable. This article argues that claims 1 
and 2 are effectively claims to human genes, whereas claims 5 and 6 are claims to 
segments of those genes. 
238 See id. at 1329 (Lourie, J., plurality opinion), 1340 (Moore, J., concurring in 
part), 1355–56 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
239 Id. at 1326–27 (Lourie, J., plurality opinion) (emphasis added). 
240 Id. at 1337–48 (Moore, J., concurring in part). 
241 Id. at 1340. 
242 Id. at 1355. 
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Court expressed in Prometheus,243 arguing that, “[a]ny preemption thus is 
limited, very limited in the case of the present patents. Moreover, patents 
are rarely enforced against scientific research, even during their terms.”244  
The facts and law, however, conflict with Judge Lourie’s statement 
and dismissal of preemption as a concern. First, the earlier part of Judge 
Lourie’s opinion acknowledged that as early as 1998, Myriad’s Chief 
Science Officer had notified a doctor at the University of Pennsylvania’s 
Genetic Diagnostic Laboratory that “Myriad was planning to stop GDL 
from providing clinical BRCA testing in light of Myriad’s patents.”245  
Judge Lourie’s opinion also discussed the cease and desist letters from 
Myriad and referred to Myriad bringing several patent infringement suits in 
1997 and 1998, which they dismissed only “after each defendant agreed to 
discontinue all allegedly infringing activity.”246 In other words, Judge 
Lourie’s opinion reflected preemption from 1997 through 2015. 
In addition, the Supreme Court in Prometheus already rejected 
Prometheus’s suggestion that a claim to a narrow law of nature was 
permitted, based on concerns with preemption.247 Specifically, the Court 
cautioned that even patents on narrow laws of nature could restrict research 
and that in “any event, our cases have not distinguished among different 
laws of nature according to whether or not the principles they embody are 
sufficiently narrow.”248 On the contrary, the Court in Prometheus noted that 
its precedents have “endorsed a bright-line prohibition against patenting 
laws of nature, mathematical formulas and the like, which serve as a 
somewhat more easily administered proxy for the underlying ‘building 
block’ concern.”249 
Judge Bryson was the only judge on the panel in Myriad Genetics 
who expressed concern about the preemptive effect of claim 1.250 He 
warned, “some of Myriad’s challenged composition claims effectively 
preempt any attempt to sequence the BRCA genes, including whole-genome 
sequencing. . . . [T]hose claims encompass unpatentable subject matter, and 
                                                      
243 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 
(2012) (“The Court has repeatedly emphasized . . . a concern that patent law not 
inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of laws of nature.”). 
244 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1331. 
245 Id. at 1314 
246 Id. at 1315.  
247 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (holding that “upholding the patents would risk 
disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying natural laws, inhibiting their 
use in the making of further discoveries.”). 
248 Id. at 1303. 
249 Id. 
250 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1349 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part).  
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a contrary ruling is likely to have substantial adverse effects on research and 
treatment in this important field.”251  
3. Standard regarding laws of nature 
Chemical Composition Only 
Judge Lourie indicated that the only applicable consideration for 
determining patentable subject matter was whether the compositions 
identified in the claims were chemically identical to the native DNA strands 
in human cells. He admitted that the remand in light of Prometheus might 
suggest the composition claims were mere reflections of a law of nature.”252 
However, he rejected that suggestion by focusing on the product and not the 
genetic code, claiming “Everything and everyone comes from nature, 
following its laws. But the compositions here are not natural products. They 
are the products of man, albeit following, as all materials do, laws of 
nature.”253  
Judge Lourie affirmatively rejected any consideration of the 
functioning of the isolated DNA and native DNA, in contrast to Judges 
Moore and Bryson. Judge Lourie argued:  
Uses of chemical substances may be relevant to the nonobviousness of 
these substances or to method claims embodying those uses, but the 
patent eligibility of an isolated DNA is not negated because it has 
similar informational properties to a different, more complex natural 
material. . . . [T]heir informational content is irrelevant . . . .254 
While Judge Lourie clearly prefers relying on the nonobvious requirement 
in § 103 to examine functioning,255 he did not explain how the function of 
DNA segments could be irrelevant under § 101, in light of the express 
requirement in § 101 that an invention be “useful.”256   
                                                      
251 Id. In addition to rejecting Claim 1, Judge Bryson argued that the claims to the 
short segments were overly broad, referring to Claim 5 in particular as 
“breathtakingly broad.” Id. at 1356. Judge Moore recognized the breadth of Claim 5 
when she said, “For this claim to be patent eligible, all of the sequences ranging 
from the 15 nucleotide sequence to the full gene must be patentable subject matter.” 
Id. at 1341 (Moore, J., concurring in part). Although Judge Moore recognized that 
Claim 1 “appears to simply serve the same ends devised by nature,” id. at 1343, she 
did not mention preemption as a factor to consider in determining the validity of 
either Claim 1 or Claim 5. 
252 Id. at 1331 (Lourie, J., plurality opinion). 
253 Id.  
254 Id. at 1330. 
255 Id. at 1303. See Graham v. John Deere Co, 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (holding that the 
emphasis on inquiry is on obviousness). 
256 See supra Part II.D. 
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Judge Lourie concluded that the chemical characteristics of the 
isolated DNA segments of claim 1 were markedly different than those of the 
native DNA. First, he stated that the native DNA, unlike the isolated DNA, 
“is condensed and intertwined with various proteins, including histones, to 
form a complex tertiary structure known as chromatin that makes up a 
larger structural complex, a chromosome.”257 He also observed that the 
“[i]solated DNA has been cleaved (i.e., had covalent bonds in its backbone 
chemically severed) or synthesized to consist of just a fraction of a naturally 
occurring DNA molecule.”258 
Yet, Judge Lourie did not explain why he rejected consideration of 
the functioning of the isolated DNA when the Supreme Court considered the 
functioning of the bacteria in determining patentable subject matter in 
Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers. In Chakrabarty, the Court held the plasmid-
enhanced bacteria had “a distinctive name, character [and] use’” than the 
natural bacteria.259  In Funk Brothers, the Supreme Court emphasized that 
the combination of bacteria did not constitute patentable subject matter, 
because there was no new bacteria and no additional utility of the existing 
bacteria.”260 
Chemical Composition Plus Function 
Judge Moore considered relevant not only the chemical 
compositions identified in the isolated DNA claims and the native DNA, 
but also the functioning of those compositions. Judge Moore said she used 
“the framework of Funk Brothers and Chakrabarty in conjunction with the 
direction of Prometheus”261 and concluded that “a composition of matter 
with ‘markedly different characteristics’ from that found in nature with the 
potential for significant utility is directed to patentable subject matter.”262   
In referring to the statement in Chakrabarty on “the potential for 
significant utility,”263 Judge Moore adopted a standard more lenient than that 
established by the Supreme Court. First, in Chakrabarty the Court repeatedly 
referred to the functional differences between the plasmid-enhanced bacteria 
and the bacteria in their natural state. For instance, the Court said that the 
plasmid-enhanced bacteria were “capable of breaking down multiple 
                                                      
257 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1328. 
258 Id. 
259 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1980) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)). 
260 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948). 
261 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1340. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310) (emphasis added). 
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components of crude oil.”264 Second, the Court relied on this difference in 
actual functioning when it observed, “[b]ecause of this property [i.e., actual 
functional differences], which is possessed by no naturally occurring 
bacteria, Chakrabarty’s invention is believed to have significant value for the 
treatment of oil spills.”265 The actual functioning of the plasmid-enhanced 
bacteria was central to the Court’s reasoning. 
Judge Moore came to two different conclusions on the functioning 
of the claimed compositions. With respect to the shorter isolated DNA 
segments, she stated the use of “a short strand of DNA as a primer or probe” 
was a substantially different utility than the natural DNA, which could not 
be used as a primer or probe266 Since the longer isolated DNA segments 
could not be used as primers or probes, she stated “the chemical and 
structural differences in the isolated gene do not clearly lead to an 
‘enlargement of the range of . . . utility’ as compared to nature.”267   This 
difference would seem naturally to lead to a conclusion that shorter DNA 
segments constituted patentable subject matter, but not longer DNA 
segments. 
Indeed, Judge Moore acknowledged that “[i]f [she] were deciding 
this case on a blank canvas, [she] might conclude that an isolated DNA 
sequence that includes most or all of a gene is not patentable subject 
matter.”268 However, Judge Moore agreed with Judge Lourie that all of the 
                                                      
264 In addition, the Court said Chakrabarty’s claim was “to a nonnaturally occurring 
manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity ‘having a 
distinctive name, character [and] use,’” rather than potentially having such a 
distinctive use. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 
121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887)). The Court also referred to the claimed subject as 
“breaking down multiple components of oil, Chakrabarty’s micro-organism,” not as 
potentially breaking down multiple components of oil. Id. at 305 n.2. 
265 Id. at 305. 
266 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1342 (Moore, J., concurring in part). Judge Moore 
did consider the natural functioning of the native DNA, saying, “There is no 
suggestion that the human body naturally uses 15–mers as primers to synthesize 
DNA, or that the attendant process of ‘probing’ a patient’s DNA to detect a 
mutation is somehow a natural law.” Id. Of course, anything found in a human 
body could presumably be put to a different use that the use of that composition in 
the body, but if any such outside use could qualify as a sufficient change in use, 
then anything in the human body would be patentable subject matter outside the 
body. Accepting such an argument would “make the ‘law of nature’ exception to 
§ 101 patentability a dead letter,” an argument the Supreme Court rejected in 
Prometheus. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
1303 (2012). 
267 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1343 (Moore, J., concurring in part) (quoting Funk 
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948)). 
268 Id. 
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product claims of Myriad Genetics constituted patentable subject matter, 
based on deference to past practices of the USPTO, discussed below.269 As 
a policy matter, this deference to past practices of the USPTO would seem 
to place the practices of the USPTO ahead of the rulings of the Supreme 
Court in Chakrabarty and Prometheus.  
Chemical Composition Plus Function Plus Inventive Concept 
Judge Bryson rejected in his dissent the argument that the chemical 
differences between the product reflected in the claim and its native 
counterpart caused the product to be patentable subject matter. He reasoned 
that “merely isolating the products of nature by extracting them from their 
natural location and making those alterations that are attendant to their 
extraction does not give the extractor the right to patent the products 
themselves.”270 
Judge Bryson recited the test from Chakrabary that both similarities 
in structure and in utility were important. He concluded that the isolated 
genes of claim 1 failed this test, noting that “[t]he structural differences 
between the claimed ‘isolated’ genes and the corresponding portion of the 
native genes are irrelevant to the claim limitations, to the functioning of the 
genes, and to their utility in their isolated form.”271 
Judge Bryson instead applied the Prometheus inventive concept test 
to the product claims. Citing Prometheus, he explained “[j]ust as a patent 
involving a law of nature must have an ‘inventive concept’  that does 
‘significantly more than simply describe . . . natural relations,’ . . . a patent 
involving a product of nature should have an inventive concept that involves 
                                                      
269 See id. at 1346 ( “I decline the opportunity to act where Congress has chosen not 
to. Congress at least implicitly approved of the Patent Office’s policy of awarding 
patents on genes and DNA sequences. For example, Congress included, as part of 
the Patent Office’s appropriations, language affirming the Patent Office’s 
interpretation of section 101 to prohibit patents on human organisms.”). Judge 
Lourie did not discuss deference to the USPTO, but did say that “disapproving of 
patents on medical methods and novel biological molecules are policy questions 
best left to Congress.” Id. at 1324–1325 (Lourie, J., plurality opinion). 
270 Id. at 1350. Judge Bryson said that “isolated lithium does not occur naturally 
because it reacts with air and water and thus is found in nature only as part of a 
chemical compound, ionically bound to other elements . . . Once isolated, lithium 
has many industrial applications, and in order to isolate lithium, it is necessary to 
break ionic bonds in the lithium compounds that are found in nature. But it seems 
plain that elemental lithium (like other elements) would not be patentable subject 
matter.” Id. at 1351. He also argued that removing a kidney from a human being 
and pulling a leaf off of a tree would make neither the kidney nor the leaf 
patentable subject matter. Id. at 1352.  
271 Id. at 1354 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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more than merely incidental changes to the naturally occurring product.”272 
When, as in Myriad Genetics, “the applicant claims a composition of matter 
that is nearly identical to a product of nature,” he argued that the following 
questions were appropriate: 
a. “[W]hether the applicant has done ‘enough’ to 
distinguish his alleged invention from the similar 
product of nature”; 
b. “Has the applicant made an ‘inventive’ contribution to 
the product of nature?”; and  
c. “Does the claimed composition involve more than 
‘well-understood, routine, conventional’ elements?”273 
Judge Bryson concluded that the answer to each of these questions was “no” 
with respect to the isolated DNA segments of claim 1.274 He emphasized 
that the natural functioning of the claimed subject matter was crucial under 
Prometheus: 
The informational content of the nucleotide sequences is the critical 
aspect of these molecules; the terminal groups added to the molecules 
when the covalent bonds are broken—to which the majority and 
concurring opinions attribute such significance—are not even 
mentioned in the claims. The nucleotide sequences of the claimed 
molecules are the same as the nucleotide sequences found in naturally 
occurring human genes.275 
As applied to claim 1, Judge Bryson found “[t]he functional portion of the 
composition—the nucleotide sequence—remains identical to that of the 
naturally occurring gene.”276 
Judge Bryson also examined the functioning of the DNA segments 
in claim 1 (“coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide”)277 when evaluating the 
significance of chemical changes resulting from the isolation of the genes 
                                                      
272 Id. at 1355 (emphasis added). 
273 Id. 
274 Id. at 1350. Judge Bryson’s analysis is consistent with the “inventive concept” 
principle used by the Prometheus Court, as well as the following statement of 
Professors Demaine and Fellmeth: “[I]t is a basic precondition of patent protection 
that applicants must have created the claimed subject matter through an ingenuous 
mental step . . . In order for a substance based upon a naturally occurring 
phenomenon to constitute an invention, that substance must be substantially 
transformed from the state in which it naturally occurs.” Demaine & Fellmeth, 
supra note 82, at 461. 
275 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1355 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
276 Id. at 1355. 
277 Id. at 1309 (Lourie, J., plurality opinion). 
No. 2] DUKE LAW & TECH REVIEW 482  
 
from the native environment. Judge Bryson explained, “the fact that the 
cleaved molecules have terminal groups that differ from the naturally 
occurring nucleotide sequences does nothing to add any inventive character 
to the claimed molecules.”278 He concluded that the “structural similarity 
[between isolated DNA and naturally occurring DNA] dwarfs the 
significance of the structural differences between isolated DNA and 
naturally occurring DNA, especially where the structural differences are 
merely ancillary to the breaking of covalent bonds, a process that is itself 
not inventive.”279 
4. Deference 
One reason Judge Moore cited for upholding claim 1 was, 
“Congress has, for centuries, authorized an expansive scope of patentable 
subject matter.”280 While that is true, the Supreme Court for centuries—in 
Morse, American Wood Paper, Cochrane, Funk Brothers, Bilski and 
Prometheus—interpreted the patent statutes to preclude patents claiming 
natural laws, physical or natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.281 As Justice 
Kennedy emphasized in Bilski, “these exceptions have defined the reach of 
the statute as a matter of statutory stare decisis going back 150 years.”282 
Moreover, as set forth above, the text of § 101 is consistent with excluding 
laws of nature and physical phenomena from patent eligibility, the acts of 
Congress do not suggest a different outcome than Supreme Court 
precedents. 
The second reason Judge Moore cited for upholding claim 1 was 
that the “US Patent and Trademark Office had allowed patents on isolated 
DNA segments for decades.”283 However, Judge Bryson pointed out that, 
“prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chakrabarty, the PTO had 
determined that microorganisms were not subject to patenting, but the 
Supreme Court gave no indication [in Chakrabarty] that it regarded that 
                                                      
278 Id. at 1355 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
279 Id. 
280 Id. at 1343 (Moore, J., concurring in part). 
281 See supra Parts I.B & C. 
282 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). 
283 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1343. Interestingly, in a decision at approximately 
the same time as the first decision of the Federal Circuit in Myriad, the Federal 
Circuit issued Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011). In Classen, Judge Moore dissented, id. at 1075, from the two other 
judges on the panel that found two patents for a “method of immunizing a 
mammalian subject” were “eligible under § 101 to be considered for patenting.” Id. 
at 1060. The USPTO had approved the patents, but Judge Moore gave no mention 
of deference to the USPTO and did not even mention the USPTO in her dissent. See 
id. at 1076–81. 
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view as entitled to deference.”284  
Judge Moore also noted that “claims similar to the ones at issue in 
this case have been the focal point of important litigation,” citing Amgen, 
Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. and Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion 
Russel, Inc., but being a focal point does not mean the issue was decided.285 
In fact, patentable subject matter was not decided in Chugai,286 nor was it 
decided in Hoechst Marion Russel.287 Subsequently, Judge Dyk even 
observed in Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd.288 that neither the Supreme Court 
nor the Federal Circuit had “directly decided the issue of the patentability of 
isolated DNA molecules” and then gave reasons supporting the argument 
that such molecules did not constitute patentable subject matter.289 There 
was simply no Federal Circuit or Supreme Court holding that decided 
whether isolated DNA segments constituted patentable subject matter.290 
                                                      
284 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1358 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). Judge Lourie replied to this point, arguing that “there is a clear difference 
between allowing additional patent protection where none previously existed, and 
denying patent protection decades (or centuries) after the fact, thereby eliminating a 
large number of property rights.” Id. at 1345. However, it seems inconsistent for 
Judge Lourie to argue on the one hand that the Myriad Genetics patents presented 
no preemption worry because they were about to expire and on the other hand claim 
that denying patentable subject matter would wreck existing property rights. 
285 Id. at 1344 (Moore, J., concurring in part) (citing Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. 
Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 
126 F. Supp. 2d 69, 77 (D. Mass. 2011)). 
286 Judge Moore is correct that the patent was upheld in Chugai, but patentable 
subject matter was not argued. See John M. Conley, Gene Patents And the Product 
of Nature Doctrine, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 109, 116 (2009) (“That Amgen's patent 
was directed to statutory subject matter was taken for granted and not at issue in the 
case.”).  
287 The issues in Amgen were claim construction, definiteness, inequitable conduct, 
obviousness, enablement, and written description, not patentable subject matter. 
126 F. Supp. 2d at 137–66. 
288 Intervet Inc. v. Merial Ltd., 617 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
289 Id. at 1293 (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
290 In what became a companion case to Chakrabarty, In re Bergy, the Federal 
Circuit held that a claim for a biologically pure culture of the microorganism 
Streptomyces vellosus was patentable subject matter. 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 
1977), vacated, 438 U.S. 902 (1978) for reconsideration in light of Parker v. Flook, 
596 F.2d 952 (Fed. Cir. 1979), cert. granted. In re Bergy was dismissed as moot in 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980). The patent examiner had rejected 
the patent application on the ground that the claim did not constitute patentable 
subject matter because the microorganism was a “product of nature.” The United 
States Patent and Trademark Board of Appeals affirmed the rejection of the 
application, but on the ground that § 101 precluded the grant of patents for living 
organisms, a slightly different issue. In re Bergy, 563 F.2d at 1033–34. When the 
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Judge Moore also argued, “[t]he settled expectations of the 
biotechnology industry—not to mention the thousands of issued patents—
cannot be taken lightly and deserve deference.”291  Yet the Supreme Court 
case Judge Moore cited, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki 
Co., involved the doctrine of equivalents and the rule of prosecution history 
estoppel292 that had been established through a series of Supreme Court 
holdings,293 not practices by administrative agencies such as the USPTO. 
Festo is simply an example of Supreme Court deference to the principle of 
stare decisis. 294 
Judge Moore selectively discussed two lower court cases upholding 
patents on purified chemical products and concluded “the settled 
expectations of the inventing community with respect to isolated DNA 
claims are built upon the broad language of . . . judicial precedent, such as 
Parke-Davis and Merck.”295 However, earlier in her opinion, Judge Moore 
admitted that “mere purification of a naturally occurring element is typically 
insufficient to make it patentable subject matter,” citing a number of other 
                                                                                                                         
rejection was appealed to the U.S. Court of Custom and Patent Appeals, that court 
said, “We consider the product-of-nature issue to have been abandoned and no 
longer in the case.” 
291 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1344. 
292 Id. (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 
722, 739 (2002)). Judge Lourie referred to both Festo and J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. 
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 144–45 (2001), for the practice of the 
PTO. In J.E.M., however, although the Court did refer to past practices of the PTO, 
the Court also said that the “Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, which has 
specific expertise in issues of patent law, relied heavily on this Court’s decision in 
Chakrabarty when it interpreted the subject matter of § 101 to include plants.” 534 
U.S. at 145. In contrast, here there has been no federal court decision, let alone a 
Supreme Court opinion, deciding that isolated DNA segments were patentable. In 
fact, as described in this article, the more reasonable interpretation of Supreme 
Court precedents is that such segments are not patentable. Festo, 535 U.S. at 739. 
Further, in J.E.M., there had been a subsequent express amendment to 35 U.S.C. 
§ 119(f) supporting the past practices of the USPTO. 534 U.S. at 145. Neither the 
reference to past Supreme Court decisions in Festo nor the passing reference to 
USPTO practices in J.E.M. is a basis for deference in Myriad Genetics. 
293 See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 
(1950); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
294 Festo, 535 U.S. at 739. 
295 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1344 (Moore, J., concurring in part). Judge Moore 
cited Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958) 
(involving products of the fermentation of a vitamin B(12) activity producing strain 
of Fungi) and Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), 
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (involving a product which 
had been isolated from the suprarenal glands). 
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appellate cases.296   Judge Moore also admitted that Funk Brothers 
“indicates that an invention which ‘serve[s] the ends nature originally 
provided’ is likely unpatentable subject matter.”297  In deferring to the 
USPTO, Judge Moore disregarded any settled expectations from Funk 
Brothers and these other appellate cases that isolated products performing 
the same function as in nature—such as isolated DNA segments—were not 
patentable.”  Also, scholars had recognized for years prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Prometheus that isolated DNA segments’ patent 
eligibility remained an unresolved question.298  As a result, even if 
expectations of the investing community were relevant, there was no reason 
to believe that the investing community believed isolated DNA segments 
were patentable.299  
Judge Bryson rejected Judge Moore’s views on deference for three 
basic reasons. First, he pointed out that “the PTO lacks substantive 
rulemaking authority as to issues such as patentability,” and that the Federal 
Circuit should only defer to the PTO to the extent of “the thoroughness of 
its consideration and the validity of its reasoning.” He concluded that the 
PTO had not thoroughly considered and studied the issue, so its views were 
not “worthy of much weight in the analysis of this complex question.”300    
Second, Judge Bryson stated that “whatever force the PTO’s views 
on the issue of patent eligibility may have had in the past,” that was 
lessened by the changed position of the United States.301 He noted that in 
                                                      
296 E.g., In re Marden, 47 F.2d 957, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (holding that purified 
vanadium and uranium are not patentable); Gen. Elec. v. DeForest Radio, Co., 28 
F.2d 641, 643 (3d Cir. 1928) (holding that purified tungsten is not patentable). 
297 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1338. 
298 See infra note 388 and accompanying text. 
299 See also In re Merz, 97 F.2d 599, 600 (C.C.P.A. 1938), affirming the rejection 
by the USPTO Board of Appeals of a patent for purifying ultramarine on the basis 
of General Electric, 28 F.2d at 641, and Marden, 47 F.2d at 958. 
300 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1357 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (quoting Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In 
Merck, the Federal Circuit explained that “[b]ecause Congress has not vested the 
Commissioner with any general substantive rulemaking power . . . the rule of 
controlling deference set forth in Chevron does not apply. Such deference as we 
owe to the PTO[] . . . thus arises, not from the rule of Chevron, but solely from, 
inter alia, the thoroughness of its consideration and the validity of its reasoning, 
i.e., its basic power to persuade if lacking power to control.” 80 F.3d at 1550. The 
mention of Chevron refers to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
301 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1358. The United States filed an amicus brief in 
support of neither party. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Neither Party, Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d 1303 (2012) (No. 2010-
1406), 2010 WL 4853320 [hereinafter US Brief]. The US Brief stated that “the 
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Myriad Genetics, “[t]he Department of Justice has twice filed a brief on 
behalf of the United States in this court taking the position that Myriad’s 
gene claims (other than the cDNA claims) are not patent-eligible.”302   
Third, Judge Bryson also pointed out that prior to Chakrabarty, the 
PTO had determined that microorganisms were not subject to patenting, but 
in Chakrabarty the Supreme Court accorded no deference to such PTO 
decisions.303 Judge Bryson added that in Chakrabarty the Court had stated 
“Congress has performed its constitutional role in defining patentable 
subject matter in § 101; we perform ours in construing the language 
Congress has employed.”304  
5. Summary 
The differences in the views of Judges Lourie, Moore, and Bryson 
set forth above on claim 1 are stark. The views of the three judges on cDNA 
are much closer together. As a result of the divergence in opinions, Part 
III.B. discusses claim 1 and argues that Funk Brothers, Chakrabarty, and 
Prometheus require a reversal of the Federal Circuit’s holding on claim 1 
and support Judge Bryon's dissent. Part III.C. addresses claim 2—the claim 
pertaining solely to cDNA—and argues that the views of all three judges on 
claim 2 are incorrect and misapply Prometheus. 
B. Claim 1 (DNA & cDNA) 
1. DNA, genes, and claim 1 
Claim 1 
“1. An isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide, said 
polypeptide having the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID 
NO:2.”305 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
United States has concluded that isolated but otherwise unaltered genomic DNA is 
not patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” US Brief at *18. The US 
Brief acknowledged that this position was different than past practice of the 
USPTO, but explained that the District Court's decision had “prompted the United 
States to reevaluate the relationship between such patents and the settled principle 
under Supreme Court precedent that the patent laws do not extend to products of 
nature.” Id.  
302 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1358. 
303 Id. 
305 Id. (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980)). 
305 Id. at 1309. 
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SEQ ID NO:2 (first line of amino acid sequence in the ‘282 patent) 
  Met  Asp  Leu  Ser  Ala  Leu  Arg Val  Glu  Glu  Val  Glu  Asn  Val  Ile  Asn306 
 
Neither humans nor Myriad Genetics created the coding 
relationship between the claim 1 polypeptides307 and the amino acid 
sequence SEQ ID NO:2.308 Judge Lourie seemed to recognize that when he 
stated “[t]he relationship between the sixty-four possible codon sequences 
[groups of three nucleic acids in a DNA strand] and their corresponding 
amino acids is known as the genetic code.”309   
The relationship between DNA and amino acids is in fact part of the 
inherent order of life.310 DNA dictates the functioning of each individual 
cell in most forms of life by directing protein production at certain times 
and amounts.311  Genes are the basic units of DNA that are responsible for 
                                                      
306 This is the list of the amino acids taken from the first line of SEQ ID NO:2. U.S. 
Patent No. 5,747,282, at col. 81–82 (filed Jun. 7, 1995), available at 
http://www.google.com/patents/US5747282 [hereinafter U.S. Patent ’282]. 
307 E.g., id. at fig. 10A to -H. See also id. at col. 5 ll. 65-7 to col.6 ll. 1-2 (note 
explaining meaning of Fig. 10A to -H). 
308 Id. at col. 81–90. 
309 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1312. See also BIOCHEMISTRY, supra note 88, at 
816 (similarly defines “genetic code” as “[t]he correspondence between a particular 
nucleotide codon and the amino acid it specifies. The standard genetic code of 64 
codons is used by almost all organisms. The genetic code is used to translate the 
sequence of nucleotides in mRNA into protein.”). 
310 See, e.g., H. LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY, at app. G-9, 111-2 (6th 
ed., 2008) [hereinafter MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY] (stating that “virtually all the 
information required for the development of a fertilized egg into an adult made of 
trillions of cells . . . can be stored in the sequence of the four possible nucleotides 
. . . in the human genome . . . . [V]irtually all forms of life use DNA to encode their 
genetic information, and also use nearly the same nucleic acid sequence code to 
specify amino acid sequence . . . .”). 
311 Conley & Makowski, supra note 54, at 311. For a detailed description of DNA 
replication and the production of protein by DNA and RNA, see Chapters 20, 21 
and 22 of BIOCHEMISTRY, supra note 88. In addition to genes that encode proteins, 
“all cells contain genes that are expressed only in special circumstances, such as 
during cell division. Multicellular organisms also contain genes that are expressed 
only in certain types of cells.” Id. at 647-8. The important biological functions of 
proteins (also called polypeptides) include: acting as enzymes (biochemical 
catalysts); binding for storage and transport of other molecules; providing 
support/shape to cells; decoding information in cells; and doing mechanical work 
such as contraction of muscles. Id. at 52-53. 
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the inheritance of discrete traits in all such living organisms.312 Each gene is 
typically thousands of nucleotides long and generally encodes one or more 
proteins, meaning the body uses the information in those nucleotides to 
produce those proteins.313 The Federal Circuit explained that “[m]ost genes 
have both ‘exons’ and ‘intron’ sequences. . . . Introns are segments of DNA 
interspersed between the exons that, unlike exons, do not code for a 
protein.”314 
Every DNA molecule is made up of four nucleotide bases—adenine 
(“A”), thymine (“T”), cytosine (“C”), and guanine (“G”)—which are 
covalently linked,315 or bonded together via a sugarphosphate or 
phosphodiester backbone.316 Claim 1, however, does not mention either 
type of backbone.317 DNA typically consists of a double helix of two 
intertwined strands of DNA chemically bound to each other through base 
pairing. The adenine on one strand of DNA always binds to the thymine on 
the other strand, and the guanine on one strand always binds to the cytosine 
on the other strand.318   
Gene expression is the process by which the information encoded in 
a gene causes the production of protein.319 The synthesis of proteins from 
                                                      
312 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 194 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated. See also, Kane, supra note 161, at 708 (“Genes are identified as 
the discrete units of DNA sequence that encode individual proteins and that 
collectively underlie the biochemical design of any organism.”); Anita Varma & 
David Abraham, DNA is Different: Legal Obviousness and the Balance between 
Biotech Inventors and the Market, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 53, 57 (1996) (“A gene is 
a region of DNA on a chromosome whose sequence encodes a specific protein.”); 
BIOCHEMISTRY, supra note 88, at 647 (“We define a gene as a DNA sequence that 
is transcribed. This definition includes genes that do not encode proteins (not all 
transcripts are messenger RNA). The definition normally excludes regions of the 
genome that control transcription but are not themselves transcribed. We will 
encounter some exceptions to our definition of a gene—surprisingly, there is no 
definition that is entirely satisfactory.”). 
313 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 194. 
314 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1311. 
315 A covalent bond is a “[s]table chemical force that holds the atoms in molecules 
together by sharing of one or more pairs of electrons.” MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY, 
supra note 310, at app. G-5. See also Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1310 n. 4. 
316 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1310–11. For a more detailed discussion of 
nucleotides, see BIOCHEMISTRY, supra note 88, at ch. 19.1. 
317 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1309 
318 Id. at 1311; Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 
193–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d (Fed. Cir. 2011) cert. 
granted, judgment vacated. 
319 MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY, supra note 310, at app. G-9. A protein is a 
macromolecule “consisting of one or more polypeptide chains. The biological 
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genes involves two steps: transcription and translation.320 During the first 
stage (transcription), the sequence of a segment of bases in the DNA is 
copied, or transcribed, into a related molecule called RNA (ribonucleic 
acid).321 RNA is also made up of nucleotides, but a strand of RNA differs 
from DNA in that it has a different sugarphosphate backbone than DNA, 
and the DNA base thymine (“T”) is replaced by a base called uracil 
(“U”).322 This yields a strand of RNA called pre-RNA, which contains both 
exons and introns.323 The introns are then excised in a process called 
splicing to produce messenger RNA (or mRNA), which contains only 
exons.324   
During the second stage in protein synthesis (translation), the 
mRNA is translated into the encoded protein “via three nucleotide 
combinations called codons.”325 Each codon results in the production of one 
of the twenty amino acids that make up all proteins or a stop signal that 
terminates protein creation.326 
2. No markedly different characteristic and no additional utility 
As discussed above, Judge Lourie concluded that the isolated DNA 
of claim 1 had markedly different characteristics than those of the native 
DNA. Judge Lourie based his conclusion on the removal of the DNA from 
the remainder of the material in the cell—such as the proteins—and the 
breaking of covalent bonds (shared electrons) between the DNA segments 
in the process of isolation.327 In Chakrabarty, although the Supreme Court 
considered both additional utility and markedly different characteristics, the 
Court did not specify any test for determining “markedly different 
characteristics.” As a result, there is no clear standard for arguing that Judge 
Lourie’s view of what constituted markedly different characteristics was 
incorrect (in contrast to Judge Lourie’s complete rejection of any 
consideration of utility). However, neither Judge Moore nor Judge Bryson 
agreed with Judge Lourie on the markedly different characteristics analysis, 
                                                                                                                         
function of each protein molecule depends not only on the sequence of covalently 
linked amino acid residues, but also on its three-dimensional structure 
(conformation).” BIOCHEMISTRY, supra note 88, at 822. “Amino acids are the 
building blocks of proteins.” Id. at 811. 
320 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1311–12. 
321 Id. at 1311. 
322 Id. at 1312.  
323 Id. at 1312. The District Court referred to this as “pre-messenger RNA” or “pre-
mRNA.” Myriad Genetics, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 197. 
324 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1311. See also BIOCHEMISTRY, supra note 88, at 
677–78. 
325 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1312.  
326 Id. 
327 Id. at 1328–30. 
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let alone utility. 
Judge Moore stated “[t]o the extent the majority rests its conclusion 
on the chemical differences between genomic and isolated DNA (breaking 
the covalent bonds), [she] cannot agree that this is sufficient to hold that the 
claims to human genes are directed to patentable subject matter.”328 Of 
course, Judge Moore was half of that “majority.” As set forth above, Judge 
Moore distinguished between the longer DNA of claim 1 (with no markedly 
different characteristics) and the shorter DNA of claim 5 (with markedly 
different characteristics).329 
In contrast, Judge Bryson stated the court should consider the 
chemical characteristics of DNA in light of the “informational content” in 
the genetic code. He argued: 
A chemical bond is merely a force between two atoms or groups of 
atoms strong enough ‘to make it convenient for the chemist to consider 
[the aggregate] as an independent molecular species.’ . . . [T]o argue 
that the isolated BRCA gene is patentable because in its native 
environment it is part of a much larger structure is no more persuasive 
than arguing that although an atom may not be patentable, a subatomic 
particle is patentable because it was previously part of a larger 
structure . . . .330 
Furthermore, Judge Bryson reasoned that on balance the “structural 
similarity dwarfs the significance of the structural differences between 
isolated DNA and naturally occurring DNA, especially where the structural 
differences are merely ancillary to the breaking of covalent bonds.”331 The 
absence of any reference to covalent bonds in claim 1 and claim 2332 
supports Judge Bryson’s analysis regarding the insignificance of the 
structural differences. 333 
The three judges expressed different views on the hypothetical of 
whether isolated lithium, which is only found in nature as a chemical 
compound, would be patentable subject matter.334  Judge Lourie merely 
                                                      
328 Id. at 1341. 
329 Id. at 1341–43. 
330 Id. at 1351, 1353. 
331 Id. at 1355. 
332 Id. at 1309. 
333 It is a fundamental principle of patent law that the words of a patent claim define 
the extent of the invention. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (en banc); Computer Docking Station Corp. v. Dell, Inc., 519 F.3d 1366, 
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
334 Judge Bryson said that “isolated lithium does not occur naturally because it 
reacts with air and water and thus is found in nature only as part of a chemical 
compound, ionically bound to other elements.” Myriad, 689 F.3d at 1351  
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observed lithium was not before the court, “so we do not attempt to evaluate 
the patentability of one form of lithium over another.”335  However, all three 
judges expressed some views on the lithium hypothetical, which evince 
important clues in considering the impact of the different positions in future 
cases,  particularly if the Supreme Court adopts one of their positions.  
Judge Lourie suggested elemental lithium—if it was not found on 
earth as an element—would be patentable subject matter. Specifically, he 
reasoned that “if lithium is found in the earth as other than elemental 
lithium . . . it is a different material.”336Judge Lourie seems to believe that if 
a laboratory could separate lithium oxide into lithium and other substances, 
then elemental lithium would be patentable. Under that theory, there would 
be no basis for rejecting the patentability of electrons or protons, if a 
company separated them from their natural surroundings on Earth. Judge 
Lourie’s position disregards the principle that the building blocks of science 
are not patentable subject matter.337 
Judge Moore, in contrast, relied on the principle that basic building 
blocks are not patentable. She suggested that elemental lithium would be 
patent ineligible because it is “a basic building block provided by nature.”338 
Judge Moore attempted to distinguish the patentability of isolated DNA 
from isolated lithium by speculating that elemental lithium must have 
existed separately at some time and that “an isolated DNA sequence did not 
necessarily exist before reacting further to produce the corresponding 
naturally occurring chromosomal DNA.”339 Regardless of which came 
first—the nucleotide sequences of the genetic code or chromosomal DNA—
the genetic code is a basic building block of life reflected in chromosomal 
DNA and claims 1 and 2 in Myriad Genetics.340 
Judge Bryson believed the analogy he proposed between chemical 
elements and isolated DNA was compelling. He argued that “elemental 
lithium (like other elements) would not be patentable subject matter, even if 
                                                                                                                         
(Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Lourie did not 
disagree with that statement. Id. at 1332 (Lourie, J.). Judge Moore responded to 
the discussion of lithium by “assuming the government’s contention that lithium 
does not currently exist in isolated form in nature” is true. Id. at 1345 n.7 
(Moore, J., concurring in part). 
335 Id. at 1332. Immediately before that conclusion, Judge Lourie said, “because it 
reacts with air and water to form, for example, lithium oxide or lithium hydroxide, 
it is a different material.” Id. 
336 Id.  
337 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 
(2012). 
338 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1345 n.7. 
339 Id.  
340 See supra notes 161–164 and accompanying text. 
No. 2] DUKE LAW & TECH REVIEW 492  
 
it could only be extracted from nature through an isolation process.”341 He 
argued that the same principle applied to genetic material such as DNA.342 
Removing anything found in nature from its natural environment, or 
synthetically creating it, and putting it in a test tube will of necessity cause 
some changes in the substance.343 If such changes caused that composition 
to have markedly different characteristics for purposes of § 101 under Judge 
Lourie’s view on “markedly different”, then § 101 would be a dead letter, a 
position the Court expressly rejected in Prometheus.344   
It is not necessary, however, to rely on the test for “markedly 
different characteristics” to conclude that the Federal Circuit erred in 
Myriad Genetics on claim 1, since Judge Lourie rejected any comparison 
between the utility of the isolated DNA of Claim 1 with that of native 
DNA.345 Instead, he claimed that the uses of a chemical substance could be 
relevant to a nonobviousness analysis under § 103, but not to a patent 
eligibility analysis under § 101.346 Judge Louri’s refusal to consider the 
utility of claim 1 is inconsistent with a number of court precedents and 
§ 101: 
1. Patentable subject matter under § 101 was the sole 
issue in Chakrabarty, and the Supreme Court relied on 
the additional utility of the human-engineered 
bacterium to support its holding of patentable subject 
matter.347 In Funk Brothers the Court rejected a 
                                                      
341 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1351. 
342 Id. 
343 Two other examples Judge Bryson gave of “isolations” that could not logically 
result in transforming unpatentable subject matter into patentable subject matter 
included (i) removing an apple hanging from an apple tree (which would cause 
some changes in the bonds which had kept the apple to the tree), and (ii) removing 
a kidney from a human (which would have caused changes in the unpatentable 
human organ removed from the human). Id. at 1350–51. 
344 132 S. Ct. at 1303–34.  
345 See supra notes 252–260 and accompanying text. 
346 Myriad Genetics, 689 F.3d at 1330. 
347 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 303–34 (1980). Not surprisingly, 
“characteristic” has more than one dictionary definition. Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged includes the 
following two definitions: “a trait, quality, or property or a group of them 
distinguishing an individual, group or type”; and “any of the variables pertaining to 
the normal performance of a device (as the grid voltage, plate current, or tube 
resistance of a vacuum tube or the voltage and watt rating of a lamp).” WEBSTER'S 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED (3rd 
ed. 2002). It is not important to determine whether in Chakrabarty the Court was 
referring to only static characteristics or performance characteristics, because 
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patent for the aggregation of bacteria, because the 
combination had no additional utility.348  In both cases 
the Court the function of the claimed subject matter 
was crucial to the determination of patentable subject 
matter. 
2. Section 101 refers to the invention or discovery of 
“any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter.”349 In Brenner, the Supreme 
Court applied the utility requirement as a fundamental 
part of the balancing of interests in granting a patent, 
stating “[t]he basic quid pro quo contemplated by the 
Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent 
monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an 
invention with substantial utility.”350 A court must 
consider the existence of additional utility in 
determining patentable subject matter under § 101. 
3. In Prometheus, the Supreme Court rejected the 
argument of the U.S. Government that § 101 should 
take a back seat to §§ 102, 103 and 112 in screening 
out patent claims.351 This rejected argument parallels 
Judge Lourie’s view that usefulness can be better 
considered as part of the nonobviousness requirement 
of § 103. Citing Funk Brothers, the Court said there 
claimed subject matter must have a “new and useful 
end” and an “inventive concept” beyond the law of 
nature.352 
Given the statutory language of § 101, the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers, and the Court’s confirmation in 
Prometheus of the independent gate-keeping role of § 101, Judge Lourie 
improperly read “useful” out of § 101 and resisted comparing the utility of 
the isolated DNA with that of native DNA. Both Judges Moore and Bryson 
concluded that the isolated DNA of claim 1 did not show utility beyond the 
utility of the native DNA,353 consistent with the district court’s findings of 
                                                                                                                         
clearly the Court referred to “utility” and considered the functioning of the native 
bacteria and the human-altered bacteria. 
348 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948). 
349 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
350 381 U.S. at 534. See also supra Part II.D. 
351 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 
(2012). 
352 Id. at 1294, 1299. 
353 See supra notes 266–268, 276 and accompanying text. 
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fact.354 The Federal Circuit, therefore, erred in refusing to consider utility in 
determining whether claim 1 constituted patentable subject matter. 
3. Nothing inventive added to the product 
The Supreme Court in Prometheus concluded that the patents at 
issue “set forth laws of nature—namely, relationships between 
concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a 
dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause harm.”355 The 
Court drew such a conclusion even though the patent claims did not identify 
any equation and required human action to trigger this relationship.356  The 
Court explained, “[t]he relation is a consequence of the ways in which 
thiopurine compounds are metabolized by the body—entirely natural 
processes. And so a patent that simply describes that relation sets forth a 
natural law.”357 
The fact that the isolated DNA segments of claim 1 had been 
isolated as the result of human intervention (or synthetically created)358 does 
not change the fact that claim 1 simply reflects the natural relationship 
between the DNA sequence identified in SEQ ID NO:2 and the identified 
amino acid sequence in patent #5,747,282.359 Indeed, claim 1 of Myriad 
Genetics in fact expresses that natural law: “DNA coding for a BRCA1 
polypeptide.”360   
In spite of the Supreme Court’s discussion in Prometheus of adding 
an incentive concept when a patent claim focuses on a law of nature, claim 
1 did not contain any inventive concept, and none of the judges in Myriad 
Genetics disputed that. In fact Judge Bryson pointed out that there was 
nothing inventive about the ‘282 patent: “Myriad was not the first to map a 
BRCA gene to its chromosomal location” and “Myriad did not invent a new 
method of nucleotide sequencing.”361 Indeed, Judges Lourie and Moore 
appeared to recognize there was no inventive concept added, since Judge 
Lourie observed, “Genomic DNA can be extracted from its cellular 
                                                      
354 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 227–32 
(2010). 
355 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1297, 1303. 
356 Id. at 1293. 
357 Id. at 1297. 
358 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1329 (2012) (Lourie, 
J., plurality opinion) (“[S]ome forms of isolated DNA may require no purification 
at all, because DNAs can be chemically synthesized directly as isolated 
molecules.”). 
359 See supra notes 252–260 and accompanying text; Figure 10A, supra note 307. 
360 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1309 (emphasis added). 
361 Id. at 1348–49. 
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environment using a number of well-established laboratory techniques.”362 
Under Prometheus, claim 1 constitutes unpatentable subject matter 
because Myriad Genetics did not add any inventive concept to the claim. 
However, even if the inventive concept principle of Prometheus did not 
apply to the ‘282 patent, claim 1 would still constitute unpatentable subject 
matter under Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers. The DNA of claim 1 does not 
have any characteristics markedly different than those of native DNA, nor 
does the isolated DNA of claim 1 have significantly different utility than 
that of native DNA.363  
4. Applicability of Prometheus to product claims 
Prometheus applies to claims 1 and 2 for a number of reasons. First, 
a fair reading of Prometheus shows that the Court did not limit the 
exclusion of laws of nature and natural phenomena to process patents.364 
Second, in discussing the exclusions, the Court cited favorably a number of 
product patent cases involving laws of nature or physical phenomena, such 
as Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers.365 Third, limiting the exclusions to 
process patents would be futile, because drafters would simply include 
processes within product claims through a number of drafting approaches. 
Indeed, the Court stated in Prometheus, “cases warn us against interpreting 
patent statutes in ways that make patent eligibility ‘depend simply on the 
draftsman’s art’ without reference to the ‘principles underlying the 
prohibition against patents for [natural laws].’” 366 
For instance, in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,367 a 
case involving the doctrine of patent exhaustion, the Supreme Court 
observed, “precedents do not differentiate transactions involving 
embodiments of patented methods or processes from those involving 
patented apparatuses or materials.”368 In Quanta, the Court cited an article 
                                                      
362 Id. at 1313 (Judge Moore’s concurrence did not take issue with this observation 
of Judge Lourie). 
363 Even assuming Judge Moore’s conclusion that the shorter isolated DNA 
segments of claim 1 had a different function than natural DNA, since claim 1 
includes both the shorter and longer DNA segments, claim 1 would still be invalid. 
364 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293-94 
(2012) (stating that “[t]he Court has long held that this provision contains an 
important implicit exception . . . laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas . . . are not patentable.”) 
365 Id. at 1293–94.  
366 Id. at 1294 (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)). 
367 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
368 Id. at 628–30 (in explaining its rejection of the argument that the patent 
exhaustion doctrine should only apply to product claims, the Court said, “[b]y 
characterizing their claims as method instead of apparatus claims, or including a 
method claim for the machine’s patented method of performing its task, a patent 
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by Professor Thomas stating that “even the most novice claims drafter 
would encounter scant difficulty in converting a patent claim from artifact 
to technique and back again.”369 
Moreover, the Federal Circuit and its predecessor have in fact 
declined to focus on the statutory “category” (i.e., process, manufacture, 
composition of matter or machine) of individual claims in determining 
patent eligibility. In CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., the 
Federal Circuit said, “[r]egardless of what statutory category . . . a claim’s 
language is crafted to literally invoke, we look to the underlying invention 
for patent-eligibility purposes.”370  Similarly, the U.S. Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals stated “[l]abels are not determinative in § 101 inquiries” and 
noted that the form of the claim, whether apparatus or  process, is often a 
drafting decision.371   
No precedent suggests that excluding laws of nature and physical 
phenomena from patentability would only apply to the process claims and 
not to product claims. Indeed, the Supreme Court held in American Fruit 
Growers and Funk Brothers that the product claims were unpatentable in 
light of the products in nature.372  As Judge Moore stated in her opinion, the 
“Prometheus discussion of laws of nature (process claims) clearly ought to 
apply equally to manifestations of nature (composition claims).”373 Judge 
                                                                                                                         
drafter could shield practically any patented item from exhaustion.”). 
369 Id. at 629 n.5. Professor Thomas’s article gave the following example: 
“[C]onsider the following artifact [product] claim: ‘An apparatus for measuring 
activity of the autonomic nervous system of a patient, comprising: means for 
obtaining ECG signals from said patient whilst said patient is at rest; means for 
measuring the R-R intervals for adjacent PQRS portions of said signals; means for 
generating a Poincare plot from said R-R intervals; and means for determining a 
level of parasympathetic activity for said patient from the width of said plot about a 
line perpendicular to the line of identity of said plot.’ A few simple changes to the 
claim transforms it to one concerned with technique, in the following way: ‘A 
method of measuring activity of the autonomic nervous system of a patient, 
comprising the steps of: obtaining ECG signals from said patient whilst said patient 
is at rest; measuring the R-R intervals for adjacent PQRS portions of said signals; 
generating a Poincare plot from said R-R intervals; and determining a level of 
parasympathetic activity for said patient from the width of said plot about a line 
perpendicular to the line of identity of said plot.’” John R. Thomas, Text, 
Technique, and the Tangible: Drafting Patent Claims Around Patent Rules, 17 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 219, 225–26 (1998).  
370 CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1374 (2011). 
371 In re Application of Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481, 485–86 (C.C.P.A. 1979). In any 
case, Claim 1 does include a process. That process is the coding of amino acids by 
the claimed DNA segments. 
372 See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text. 
373 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
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Bryson evidently agreed with Judge Moore on this point, since he discussed 
and applied the Prometheus requirement of an inventive concept.374 As 
Judge Bryson said, “Myriad’s argument that Prometheus is constrained to 
methods is an untenable position.”375 
5. No basis for deferral to the USPTO 
Judge Bryson’s refusal to defer to the USPTO should have 
prevailed for the three basic reasons he set forth376 and for a number of 
additional reasons. First, the Federal Circuit has consistently ruled that 
patentable subject matter is a question of law for which it gives no 
deference to the USPTO. For instance, in Fort Properties, Inc. v. American 
Master Lease LLC,377 Fort Properties sought a declaration that an 
investment method patent was invalid. The District Court granted summary 
judgment, finding that no claim constituted patentable subject matter and 
therefore each claim was invalid.378 On appeal, the three judge panel—
including Judge Moore—affirmed the District Court and held “[i]ssues of 
patent-eligible subject matter are questions of law and are reviewed without 
deference.”379 Regardless of whether the Federal Circuit referred to no 
deference to the USPTO or to the District Court,380 the Federal Circuit did 
not in fact defer to the USPTO and held invalid each claim the USPTO had 
granted.381 
                                                      
374 See 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294; supra notes 272–276 and accompanying text. 
375 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1340. 
376 Id. at 1357–58. See supra notes 300–304 and accompanying text. 
377 Fort Properties, Inc. v. American Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). 
378 Id. at 1318 (the patent involved was Patent No. 6,292,788). 
379 Id. at 1320 (emphasis added) (quoting CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, 
Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). Judge Bryson was on the judicial panel 
in CyberSource. 
380 Since the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court, it is 
logical to conclude the Federal Circuit was referring to no deference to the 
USPTO. 
381 The reference to question of law really appears to be directed to question of 
invalidity. The Federal Circuit has indicated in certain situations there can be 
underlying questions of fact on the question of patentable subject matter. See In re 
Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. 
Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1055–56 (Fed. Cir. 1992). However, to the extent 
the Federal Circuit thought there were underlying questions of fact, it is difficult to 
explain the Federal Circuit’s decision in light of the conflicting findings of fact by 
the District Court and any failure of the Federal Circuit to conclude “clear error” in 
those factual findings granting summary judgment for the plaintiff. Cf. Stuart M. 
Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can 
Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 299-300 (2007) (noting that “the 
Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated that it grants no deference whatsoever to PTO 
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Similarly, the majority (including Judges Lourie and Moore) of the 
Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Bilski gave no deference in tightening 
requirements for the thousands of business method patents the USPTO had 
granted.382 Then the Supreme Court in Bilski in turn showed no deference to 
the USPTO or the Federal Circuit in modifying the Federal Circuit’s 
decision..383 
Finally, and most recently, the unanimous Supreme Court showed 
no deference to the USPTO's grant of patents in Prometheus.384 In fact, the 
Court also implicitly rejected the “settled expectations” argument in 
Prometheus, since Myriad Genetics had filed an amicus brief and argued in 
part II that the personalized medicine industry was built on the settled 
expectations of the eligibility of their patents.”385 Noting that several amici 
had argued that denying patent coverage would interfere “with the ability of 
medical researchers to make valuable discoveries,” the Court rejected such 
concerns.386 The Court pointed out that the applicable “community” was a 
vague concept and noted “[o]ther medical experts . . . argue strongly against 
a legal rule that would make the present claims patent eligible, invoking 
policy considerations that point in the opposite direction.”387  In sum, there 
                                                                                                                         
legal interpretations.” (citing Arnold P’ship v. Dudas, 362 F.3d 1338, 1341 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004))). 
382 See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 992–94 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (statistics cited by Judge 
Newman in dissent). 
383 In fact, the only reference to “Trademark Office” in the Supreme Court's 
decision in Bilski appears to be the following footnote 35 in Justice Stevens’s 
concurring opinion: “Although a few patents issued before 1952 that related to 
methods of doing business . . . these patents were rare, often issued through self-
registration rather than any formalized patent examination, generally were not 
upheld by courts, and arguably are distinguishable from pure patents on business 
methods insofar as they often involved the manufacture of new objects. See In re 
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 974 & n.18 (Fed. Cir. 2008).” Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 
3218, 3246 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal citations 
omitted). 
384 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1295 
(2012). 
385 Brief for Respondent at 12, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 5373694, at *12 
(capitalization in original). 
386 Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1304–05 (stating that interfering with the ability of 
medical researchers to make valuable discoveries would be an even more severe 
restraint than would affecting expectations of the inventing community, but the 
Court rejected concern over that more severe restraint). 
387 Id. (noting the following distinguished entities arguing against patentability in 
Prometheus: American Medical Association, the American College of Medical 
Genetics, the American Hospital Association, the American Society of Human 
Genetics, the Association of American Medical Colleges, the Association for 
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is no legal basis for the Federal Circuit to defer to the USPTO on the issue 
of patentable subject matter.388 
6. Claim 1 conclusion 
Because the subject matter in claim 1 is a BRCA gene,  it was error 
for the Federal Circuit to hold under Prometheus, Chakrabarty, and Funk 
Brothers that claim 1 was patent eligible. Claim 1 reflects both an inherent 
physical phenomenon (the gene—comprised of exons and introns)389 and a 
law of nature (the genetic code—the correlation between the nucleotides 
and the amino acids created by those exons) that humans did not invent. 
Under Prometheus, there was no step, let alone an inventive step, that claim 
1 added to the phenomenon of nature or law of nature that could have 
resulted in patentable subject matter.  
Even if Prometheus did not apply to claim 1, Chakrabarty, Funk 
Brothers, and over 150 years of Supreme Court precedents required a 
conclusion of ineligibility. First, the DNA segments of claim 1 did not 
become markedly different from the native DNA simply because they were 
“isolated” or synthetically created.390 Second, the DNA segments of claim 1 
                                                                                                                         
Molecular Pathology. Of course, the Association for Molecular Pathology is the 
named plaintiff in Myriad Genetics.). 
388 As set forth above in Part III.D.1, scholars have argued since 1990 that whether 
isolated DNA segments constitute patentable subject matter is an unanswered 
question. In 1990, Professor Eisenberg noted that “the patents may still be 
vulnerable to challenges to their validity in the courts.” Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Patenting the Human Genome, 39 EMORY L. J. 721, 721–22 & n.4 (1990). In 2003, 
Professors Conley and Makowski wrote that “the product of nature doctrine still has 
a meaningful role to play in the protection of the biological public domain,” and 
that “there is no warrant in the history of the product of nature doctrine for allowing 
it to be circumvented by the mere incantation of some combination of the words 
‘isolated,’ ‘purified,’ and ‘synthesized.’” Conley & Makowski, supra note 71, at 
398. In 2004, Professor Kane wrote “[t]he patenting of genes . . . results in 
constructive preemption of the genetic code, an outcome that conflicts with the 
Supreme Court’s dictate that the laws of nature should remain in the public domain, 
free for all to use.” Kane, supra note 161, at 765. 
389 See MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY, supra note 310 (containing the following 
definition of gene: “Physical and functional unit of heredity, which carries 
information from one generation to the next. In molecular terms, it is the entire 
DNA sequences—including exons, introns and transcription-control regions—
necessary for production of a functional polypeptide or RNA.”); BIOCHEMISTRY, 
supra note 88, at 816 (containing a slightly different definition of gene: “Loosely 
defined as a segment of DNA that is transcribed. In some cases, the term gene may 
also be used to refer to a segment of DNA that encodes a functional protein or 
corresponds to a mature RNA molecule.”). This second sentence would include as a 
gene a cDNA molecule, since those exons are what encodes a functional protein.  
390 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1350–53 (2012) 
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do not have any utility beyond what native DNA segments have, even if 
those isolated DNA segments were considered to be markedly different.391 
Finally, there was no legal basis for the Federal Circuit to defer to the 
practice of the PTO based on settled expectations of a scientific community.  
C. Claim 2 (cDNA) 
1. Claim 2 and cDNA 
Complementary DNA, or cDNA, is a type of DNA molecule 
catalyzed by a protein known as “reverse transcriptase” generated from 
mRNA (messenger mRNA)392 during “reverse transcription.”393 During 
reverse transcription, each mRNA nucleotide serves as a clamp for the 
complementary nucleotide in the new cDNA molecule as the chemical 
bonds between the nucleotides of the cDNA strand form. Uracil on the 
mRNA binds to and acts as a clamp for the adenine on the cDNA, adenine 
for thymine, guanine for cytosine, and cytosine for guanine.394 Since “it is 
synthesized from mRNA, cDNA contains only the exon sequences, and thus 
none of the intron sequences, from a native gene sequence.”395 As a result of 
the absence of introns, the production of proteins from cDNA does not 
require RNA splicing, in contrast to the production of the same protein from 
native DNA.396   
                                                                                                                         
(“But to argue that the isolated BRCA gene is patentable because in its native 
environment it is part of a much larger structure is no more persuasive than arguing 
that although an atom may not be patentable, a subatomic particle is patentable 
because it was previously part of a larger structure, or that while a tree is not 
patentable, a limb of the tree becomes a patentable invention when it is removed 
from the tree.”). 
390 Id. at 1342–44 (Moore, J., concurring). 
391 Id. 
392 See supra note 324 and accompanying text. 
393 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 198 (2010). 
See also HORTON ET AL., supra note 88, at 729, 815, 823 (referring to reverse 
transcriptase as an enzyme but also stating that an “enzyme” is a “biological 
catalyst, almost always a protein“). 
394 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 198. 
395 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1313. 
396 See Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 702 F.Supp.2d at 198–99 (stating that a 
scientist typically generates cDNA in a laboratory). However, cDNA does exist in 
nature as a result of retroviruses (viruses that have two identical RNA strands). 
MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY, supra note 310, at 158. In the life cycle of a 
retrovirus, “a viral enzyme called reverse transcriptase initially copies the viral 
RNA genome into single-stranded DNA complementary to the virion RNA; the 
same enzyme then catalyzes synthesis of a complementary DNA strand.” Id. A 
“virion” is “an individual viral particle.” Id. at app. G-24. For additional discussion 
of retroviruses, see id. at 159 and 229–30. 
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By definition, the cDNA of claim 2 is a subset of the DNA of claim 
1, since claim 2 is a dependent claim.397 Reading the two claims together, 
claim 2 is: “The isolated DNA of claim 1 [DNA coding for a BRCA1 
polypeptide with the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:2], 
wherein said DNA has the nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:1.” 
SEQ ID NO:1 lists the sequence of the nucleotides398 in the first row below, 
all coding for the amino acids identified in the second row below:399     
SEQ ID NO:1  (mentioned in claim 2) 
ATG GAT TTA TCT GCT CTT CGC GTT GAA GAA GTA CAA AAT GTC ATT AAT400 
Met  Asp  Leu  Ser   Ala  Leu  Arg   Val  Glu   Glu   Val   Glu  Asn   Val   Ile   Asn401 
This amino acid sequence is the same sequence listed below in SEQ ID 
NO2 from claim 1: 
 Met  Asp  Leu  Ser  Ala  Leu  Arg  Val  Glu  Glu  Val  Glu  Asn  Val  Ile  Asn402 
Put another way, claim 2 does not add any material, but merely narrowed 
claim 1. The only difference between claim 1 and claim 2 is that introns 
(non-coding nucleotides) are absent from the DNA in claim 2.403 
 
                                                      
397 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2010), ¶ 4 (pre-AIA) provides that, “[s]ubject to the following 
paragraph, a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously 
set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim 
in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations 
of the claim to which it refers.” (Post-AIA, the same paragraph is lettered (d) and 
begins, “Subject to subsection (e).”). 
398 The nucleotides are grouped in threes and called codons. 
399 Each amino acid is identified by three letters, in contrast to each base, which is 
identified by one letter, A, T, G or C. See Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d 
at 1310–11; infra notes 425–426 and accompanying text. 
400 This is one line from SEQ ID NO:1—the list of nucleotides in U.S. Patent ’282, 
supra note 306, at col. 69–70. 
401 This is a list of the amino acids coded by the nucleotide sequence immediately 
above the amino acid. Id. at col. 69–70. The amino acids on this line are 
Methionine, Asparagine, Leucine, Serine, Alanine, Leucine, Arginine, Valine, 
Glutamine, Glutamine, Valine, Asparagine, Valine, Isoleucine and Asparagine. See 
The Chemistry of Amino Acids, DEP’T OF BIOCHEMISTRY & MOLECULAR 
BIOPHYSICS AT UNIV. OF ARIZ., http://www.biology.arizona.edu/ 
biochemistry/problem_sets/aa/aa.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). 
402 This is the list of the amino acids taken from the first line of SEQ ID NO:2 from 
U.S. Patent ’282, supra note 306, at col. 81–82. 
403 See Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1329 (“Claim 2 of the ’282 
patent is narrower than claim 1 and reads only on cDNAs, which lack the non-
coding introns present in the genomic BRCA1 gene.”) (Lourie, J., plurality 
opinion). 
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2. Federal Circuit’s focus on the product vs. the law of nature 
Judge Lourie focused on cDNA as a product, disregarding the law 
of nature reflected in the genetic code set forth in claim 2. He seemed to 
rely on the government’s argument that cDNA molecules “were engineered 
by man . . . [and] with rare exceptions, they do not occur in nature, either in 
isolation or as contiguous sequences within a chromosome.”404 Judge 
Lourie concluded that since the cDNA lacked the non-coding introns 
existing in natural DNA before transcription,405 cDNA was patentable 
because “[t]hey are even more the result of human intervention into nature 
[than the DNA molecules of claim 1 that were not cDNA] and are hence 
patent-eligible subject matter.”406     
Judge Moore also focused on the cDNA as a product rather than on 
the law of nature involved and emphasized that “the claimed cDNA 
sequences do not exist in nature.”407 Yet in Prometheus, even though the 
                                                      
404 Id. at 1326. It seems reasonable to conclude from Judge Lourie's statement about 
“rare exceptions” that he recognizes that in some situations cDNA was found in 
nature. 
405 See supra notes 392–396 and accompanying text.  
406 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1329. The District Court in Myriad 
Genetics granted summary judgment in part, after stating the rule that “[s]ummary 
judgment is granted only where there exists no genuine issue of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Assoc. for Molecular 
Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (2010) (citations omitted). In contrast, 
the Federal Circuit eschewed any discussion of the standard for summary judgment. 
See generally Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1324–25. Even though 
determining the existence of patentable subject matter is ultimately a question of 
law, there can be underlying factual disputes involved in determining patentable 
subject matter. See Arrythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 
1053, 1055–56 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Whether a claim is directed to statutory subject 
matter is a question of law . . . determination of this question may require findings 
of underlying facts specific to the particular subject matter and its mode of 
claiming . . . .”). See also In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(“[T]here may be cases in which the legal question as to patentable subject matter 
may turn on subsidiary factual issues”). It is beyond the scope of this article to 
discuss whether summary judgment for either party was appropriate in light of the 
differences between the findings of fact of the District Court and the Federal 
Circuit's apparently fact-based view of cDNA. Regardless of whether granting 
summary judgment was error as a matter of law in light of the apparent 
disagreement on facts, to decide such crucial issues relating to the building blocks 
of life when there are genuine disputes about the facts seems unfortunate. 
407 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 698 F.3d at 1340 (Moore, J., concurring in 
judgment). This paragraph accepts for the sake of argument Judge Moore's claim 
that cDNA does not exist in nature, in spite of the contrary finding of the District 
Court. 
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record indicated that thiopurine drugs did not exist in nature,408 the Supreme 
Court held that the patents “set forth laws of nature—namely, relationships 
between concentrations of certain metabolites in the blood and the 
likelihood that a dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause 
harm.”409 In other words, the relationship between chemicals inserted into 
the human body and the reaction of the human body reflected an 
unpatentable natural law, even though the claim included no mathematical 
formula and the chemicals inserted were not found in nature. 
Judge Bryson similarly focused on a product instead of the law of 
nature involved, stating “[t]he cDNA cannot be isolated from nature, but 
instead must be created in the laboratory.”410 He further stated “[t]he end 
product is a human-made invention with distinct structure.”411 
Contrary to the Federal Circuit panel’s focus on whether cDNA 
existed in nature in the same form, Supreme Court precedents have 
established that human intervention does not automatically transform a 
physical phenomenon or law of nature into patentable subject matter. In 
Badische, the Supreme Court invalidated a patent for artificial alizarine 
produced by humans from anthracine.412  The Court held that, although the 
process for making the synthetic alizarine could be patentable, the product 
was not and noted that “[c]alling it artificial alizarine did not make it a new 
composition of matter.”413    
There was again human intervention in American Fruit Growers—
the addition of borax to the rind of citrus fruit to render the fruit resistant to 
                                                      
408 The lower court record indicates thiopurine drugs are man-made. In Prometheus 
Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 2008 WL 878910, *6 (S.D. Cal. 2008), 
the District Court rejected Prometheus Labs’ argument “that the claimed 
correlations cannot be natural phenomena because the correlations would not have 
existed without the intervention of man-made drugs.” In Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. 
Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2009), the Federal 
Circuit rejected the argument that “Bilski does not apply where, as here, the 
treatment methods use synthetic drugs and thus do not recite or wholly preempt any 
natural phenomenon.” 
409 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296 
(2012). 
410 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1356 (Bryson, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
411 Id. 
412 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
413 Cochrane v. Badische, 111 U.S. 293, 311 (1884). While John Conley and 
Roberte Makowski have referred to this view of the case as “effectively dictim,” 
they are mistaken. Conley & Makowski, supra note 54, at 328 n.193 (2003). This is 
not dictum, because the Court did not choose between the two views of the case 
when it concluded that “[i]n either view the decree of the circuit court must be 
reversed . . . .” Cochrane, 111 U.S. at 313. 
No. 2] DUKE LAW & TECH REVIEW 504  
 
blue mold decay.414 Yet the Supreme Court invalidated the patent, even 
though the human-treated fruit had borax in the rind, which natural fruit did 
not have, and the added borax allowed the human-treated fruit to stay fresh 
longer than the natural fruit.415 
Similarly in Funk Brothers the mixing together of certain bacteria 
into a powder of liquid base by humans did not make the patent valid.416 
Although mixing bacteria avoided inhibiting effects that certain bacteria 
naturally had on other bacteria, the Supreme Court concluded, “[t]he 
combination of species produces . . . no enlargement of the range of their 
utility.”417 Such utility reflected “manifestations of laws of nature, free to all 
men and reserved exclusively to none.”418  
There was sufficient human intervention in Chakrabarty for the 
Supreme Court to find patentable subject matter, but that decision cannot 
support the Federal Circuit’s decision in Myriad Genetics. In Chakrabarty, 
the Supreme Court noted Congress “recognized that the relevant distinction 
was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of 
nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions.”419 In referring 
to “human-made inventions,” the Court did not suggest that any human 
intervention would be sufficient. Instead, the Court held that the plasmid-
injected bacteria constituted patentable subject matter because it was “a 
product of human ingenuity, ‘having a distinctive name, character [and] 
use.’”420 Indeed, the reference in Chakrabarty to human ingenuity mirrors 
the Court’s reference to “inventive concept” in Prometheus when the claim 
focuses on a law of nature.421 
Most recently, Prometheus also featured human intervention in 
administering a drug to an individual and determining the level of related 
metabolites in the individual.422 The Supreme Court held that these steps of 
administering by doctors and determining by doctors were “not sufficient to 
transform unpatentable natural correlations into patentable applications.”423 
The Court emphasized that its precedents insisted that a process that focuses 
upon the use of a natural law contain additional elements, an inventive 
                                                      
414 Am. Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 6 (1931). 
415 See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
416 See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text. 
417 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948). 
418 Id. at 130. 
419 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980). 
420 Id. at 310 (emphasis added) (quoting Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 
(1887)). 
421 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294, 
1299 (2012). 
422 Id. at 1295. 
423 Id. at 1298. 
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concept, but the additional steps in Prometheus   consisted of “well-
understood, routine, conventional activity already engaged in by the 
scientific community.”424  
Human intervention does not necessarily render the resultant 
substance or process a patentable subject matter instead of an excluded law 
of nature or physical phenomenon. Judges Lourie, Moore, and Bryson 
appeared to disregard this principle in evaluating claim 2, even though 
Judge Lourie admitted “[t]he relationship between the sixty-four possible 
codon sequences and their corresponding amino acids is known as the 
genetic code.”425 None of the three judges suggested that humans created 
this genetic code, and indeed the District Court in Myriad Genetics held “it 
is undisputed that the ordering of the nucleotides is determined by 
nature.”426    
3. Judge Moore’s analysis of characteristics and function of cDNA 
Judge Moore discussed the difference between isolated cDNA and 
native RNA and between isolated cDNA and native DNA. She said that 
cDNA has a complementary sequence of nucleotides, and, as a result, a 
different nucleotide sequence than RNA. She added that DNA has a 
different chemical structure than RNA, including a different base (thymine 
instead of uracil) and different sugar backbones (deoxyribose instead of 
ribose).427 Different chemical structures result in greater stability for the 
DNA than for the RNA sequence.428 Therefore, Judge Moore concluded, 
“cDNA sequences thus have a distinctive character and use, with markedly 
different chemical characteristics from either the naturally occurring RNA 
or any continuous DNA sequence found on the chromosome.” 429  
The more apt comparison, however, is between the cDNA of claim 
2 and the corresponding natural DNA segment. With respect to the 
comparison, Judge Moore said, “since cDNA has all of the introns removed, 
and only contains the coding nucleotides, it can be used to express a protein 
                                                      
424 Id. at 1294. 
425 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 
2012); see also supra notes 309–310. This is consistent with the definition of 
genetic code in BIOCHEMISTRY, supra note 88, at 816 (“The correspondence 
between a particular three nucleotide codon and the amino acid it specifies. The 
standard genetic code of 64 codons is used by almost all organisms. The genetic 
code is used to translate the sequence of nucleotides in mRNA into protein.”).  
426 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 194–95 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
427 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1340 (Moore, J., concurring in 
part). 
428 Id. 
429 Id. at 1340–41. 
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in a cell which does not normally produce it.”430 Judge Bryson concluded 
“the cDNA has a utility not present in the naturally occurring BRCA DNA 
and mRNA because cDNA can be attached to a promoter and inserted into a 
non-human cell to drive protein expression.”431 Yet cDNA encodes the 
same protein as DNA, but since cDNA is produced from mRNA, cDNA  
produces the proteins without the first transcription step of natural DNA. 432    
On the other hand, DNA segments with introns produce the same 
result—the same proteins—as the cDNA, only through an additional step. 
This additional step should not lead to a different outcome in the patentable 
subject matter analysis. As the Supreme Court held in Badische, “[w]hile a 
new process for producing it was patentable, the product itself could not be 
patented, even though it was a product made artificially for the first time, in 
contradistinction to being eliminated from the madder root.”433 Similarly, 
the human-performed step of mixing bacteria into a paste in Funk Brothers 
did not cause the combination of bacteria to become patentable subject 
matter. 434   
Aside from the removed introns that do not code for applicable 
proteins, the sequence of bases in claim 2 are identical to the sequence of 
coding bases in native DNA and the bases of claim 2 perform the same 
function as the coding bases of native DNA. As Judge Bryson pointed out, 
“the genetic coding sequence that is the subject of each of the BRCA gene 
claims remains the same whether the gene is in the body or isolated.”435 As 
a result, removing the introns is arguably irrelevant in determining whether 
the cDNA has markedly different characteristics and function than native 
DNA.  
                                                      
430 Id. at 1340 (emphasis in original). 
431 Id. at 1355–56 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
432 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 198–99 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining that “cDNA does not contain non-coding intronic 
sequences because it is derived from mRNA in which the introns have been 
removed. As a result, the production of proteins from cDNA does not require 
RNA splicing, in contrast to the production of proteins from native DNA as 
described above.”). 
433 Cochrane v. Badische, 111 U.S. 293, 31 (1884). Madder is “a Eurasian herb 
(Rubia tinctorum of the family Rubiaceae, the madder family) with whorled leaves 
and small yellowish panicled flowers succeeded by dark berries;” however it can 
refer broadly to “any of several related herbs (genus Rubia).” Madder, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
madder (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). The “root of the Eurasian madder [was] used 
formerly in dyeing . . . [and] an alizarin dye [was] prepared from it.” Id. 
434 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 129, 131 (1948). 
435 Assoc. for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1351 (Bryson, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
507 AFTER PROMETHEUS [Vol. 11 
 
On the other hand, assume for the sake of argument that under 
Chakrabartry there are enough differences in the characteristics and 
functioning of the cDNA for claim 2 to constitute patentable subject matter. 
The next section argues that under Prometheus, claim 2 would still 
constitute unpatentable subject matter because claim 2 focuses on the 
genetic code without any inventive concept added to the genetic code. 
4. Nothing inventive added to the law of nature 
Although claim 2 arguably adds something beyond the law of 
nature—the actual sequence of the DNA—there is nothing inventive about 
that addition. As Judge Bryson stated, “Myriad was not the first to map a 
BRCA gene to its chromosomal location.”436 Judge Bryson further observed 
“Myriad did not invent a new method of nucleotide sequencing. Instead, it 
applied known sequencing techniques to identify the nucleotide order of the 
BRCA genes.”437 Under Prometheus, that step of identifying the nucleotide 
sequence is “not sufficient to transform unpatentable natural correlations 
into patentable applications.”438 
Claim 2 in fact sets forth the natural correlation between 
nucleotides and amino acids more clearly than claim 1.439 Claim 2 identifies 
only the nucleotides—the exons—that code for the amino acids referred to 
in claim 1. Neither Myriad Genetics nor any human created such 
relationship inherent in nature—the genetic code. Neither Myriad nor any 
human added anything inventive to the genetic code claimed to warrant 
holding claim 2 patentable subject matter. Indeed, Myriad Genetics simply 
removed excess material in claim 1 that did not participate in creating the 
amino acids. Under Prometheus, the Federal Circuit should have held claim 
2 did not constitute patentable subject matter.  
                                                      
436 Id. at 1348. 
437 Id. at 1349. In discussing the isolation of the DNA, Judge Bryson added, “The 
cleaving of covalent bonds incident to isolation is itself not inventive, and the fact 
that the cleaved molecules have terminal groups that differ from the naturally 
occurring nucleotide sequences does nothing to add any inventive character to the 
claimed molecules.” Id. at 1355. See also Demain & Fellmeth, supra note 82 at 400 
(“If a naturally occurring DNA molecule has the useful function of coding for 
Protein X, then no purified or otherwise altered version of that DNA molecule can 
be ‘new’ unless its claimed function is fundamentally different than coding for 
Protein X.”). 
438 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 
(2012). 
439 E.g., U.S. Patent ’282, supra note 306, at fig.10A-H. As Patent ’282 details, 
“[i]ndefinite intervals within introns are designated with vvvvvvvvvvvv,” which 
shows that the ’282 patent did not identify all of the introns. 
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CONCLUSION 
Supreme Court precedents do not become irrelevant simply because 
they are old, yet Judge Lourie’s and Judge Moore’s 2012 opinions in 
Myriad Genetics would suggest otherwise. The deference shown by Judges 
Lourie and Moore to the USPTO finds no support in Supreme Court 
cases.440 The isolated DNA segments of claim 1 reflect human genes that 
actually exist in nature, with neither substantial variation in characteristics 
nor variation in function. The holdings in Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers 
require the reversal of the Federal Circuit’s decision on claim 1. 
Finally, the narrow interpretation by Judges Lourie, Moore, and 
Bryson of Prometheus threatens to eviscerate the public domain in a vital 
area of scientific research. The DNA of claim 1 reflects a physical 
phenomenon (the sequence of nucleotides) and a law of nature (the 
correlation between the exons and the amino acids expressed by those exons 
constituting the genetic code). The cDNA of claim 2 also reflects that 
genetic code. If the genetic code is not a law of nature, nothing is a law of 
nature.   
Myriad Genetics added nothing inventive to that law of nature to 
warrant the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that claim 1 and claim 2 
constituted patentable subject matter. Prometheus calls for a reversal of the 
Federal Circuit’s decision on both claim 1 and claim 2.  
                                                      
440 See supra Part III.B.5. To the extent there are underlying factual disputes, 
there is no basis set forth in the Federal Circuit’s three decisions for reversing 
the findings of fact of the District Court. See generally Assoc. for Molecular 
Pathology v. USPTO, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 227–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
